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ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS INCOME
ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS INCOME FOR STATE
INCOME TAX PURPOSES
By WILLIAm W. WATSON*
A MANUFACTURING company incorporated in one state has its
factory in another. It purchases all its raw materials in a
third state. Its officers live in a fourth state, from which the
business is controlled and managed. The, company's only sales
office, from which all deliveries are made, is in a fifth, in which all
customers reside and all sales are consummated. The company
operates as an integral unit. By reason of the location of the factory
within its borders one state claims the net income of the company
is taxable by it. Another claims the net income taxable by it
because purchases of raw materials are made tlfere. A third
claims that the management of the business from within the state
also justifies taxation of the company's net income. A fourth
claims that the sales activities within the state justify income taxa-
tion by it.' The manufacturing company claims that it is not tax-
*Special Assistant Attorney General, Minnesota. This article expresses
the personal views of the author only.
'The first state claims the company's entire net income also taxable
by it because of the company's incorporation under its laws. With respect
to this claim no question of allocation is raised. Instead there is that of the
power to tax income from extra-state sources. Whether there is such power
over domestic corporations or resident individuals is not within the scope
of this article. For cases which uphold the power of the state of incor-
poration to tax income earned in business outside the state see Crescent
Manufacturing Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, (1924) 129 S. C. 480,
124 S. E. 761 and State v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., (1925) 138 Miss. 70,
108, 104 So. 689, 693 (income from business done both within and
without the state taxed); Porto Rico Coal Co. v. Edwards, (S.D.N.Y.
1921) 275 Fed. 104 (U. S. corporation taxed by federal government on
income from business done exclusively in Porto Rico) ; Porto Rico Mer-
cantile Co. v. Gallardo (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 526, 529
(dictum) ; and Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga.
App. 660, 664, 179 S. E. 563, 565. The United States Supreme Court
apparently has not, as yet, finally passed upon this question. Residents
have been taxed on income from business outside of the state. Lawrence v.
State Tax Comm'n of Miss., (1932) 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556, 76
L. Ed. 1102, 87 A. L. R. 374 (resident of Mississippi taxed on income
from construction business in Tennessee) ; Head v. Maxwell, (1939) 60
Ga. App. 488, 4 S. E. (2d) 45 (resident partner taxed on income from
firm business carried on entirely outside the state) ; State v. Weil, (1936)
232 Ala. 578, 168 So. 679, affirmed on rehearing in (1939) 237 Ala. 293,
186 So. 467 (resident partner taxed on income from business carried on
partly outside the state) ; People ex rel. Woolworth v. State Tax Comm'n,
(1922) 200 App. Div. 287, 192 N. Y. S. 772. In other states the right to
tax residents on extra-state income has, as a matter of construction, been
denied: State ex rel. Arpin v. Eberhardt, (1914) 158 Wis. 20, 147 N. W.
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able in any of the states mentioned. It contends that it is entitled
to a separate accounting, that such accounting shows that its
operations are carried on at a loss in all states except the fifth
state; that the constitution of that state prohibits income taxa-
tion; that, should a separate accounting be denied by any of the
other states, then a meritorious case is presented for the applica-
tion of an "equitable" apportionment ;1a and that an apportionment
formula, if applied by these states, would be unconstitutional as
taking property without due process of law.2
This dispute between the taxpayer and its sovereign involves
statutes which in the states mentioned might impose a tax with
respect to foreign corporations 3 upon net income from "business
transacted," 4 "carried on," 5 or "done," 6 within the state, or from
"sources within the state.'", Where the business is conducted in
more than one state a method of allocation is usually set forth
in these statutes for determining the portion of "net income attri-
butable to business within the state. This allocation may be by
apportionment formula, by separate accounting, or by "equitable"
apportionment.' If the business is located entirely within the
1016 (resident partner's income from partnership business in Texas);
State ex rel. Mariner v. Hampel, (1920) 172 Wis. 67, 178 N. W. 244
(resident trustees' income from mining business in Michigan). For prob-
lems of classification see Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, (1920) 253
U. S. 412, 40 Sup. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989 and McCarroll v. Gregory-
Robinson-Speas, (1939) 198 Ark. 235, 129 S. W. (2d) 254, 122 A. L. R.
977. See generally annotation in 87 A. L. R. 380.
LaSee subdivision II, C of this article entitled, "Allocation by Equitable
Apportionment."
2To St. Augustine who, in De Civitate Dei, said, "If there be no
justice, what are kingdoms but great robber bands?" the taxpayer would
argue there was no justice. Clapp v. Heiner, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1931)
51 F. (2d) 224, 226 might be quoted in the argument: "The appeal to
conscience made by the taxpayer might be answered generally by saying
that in taxation that guide has little if any place."
sAnd non-residents.4
-Arizona, Rev. Code Supp. 1934, sec. 3182b; Colorado, Laws 1937,
ch. 175, sec. 2 (b) ; Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1935, sec. 79-3203(b) ; Oklahoma,
Statutes Supp. 1936, sec. 12498f(a); Wisconsin, Statutes 1939, sec. 71.01.
$Maryland, Laws 1939, ch. 277, sec. 12-246(b); Mississippi, Code,
Supp. 1938, ch. 124, sec. 1606(2); North Carolina, Public Laws 1939,
ch. 158, Art. IV, Schedule D, sec. 301(c); North Carolina, Code 1935,
sec. 7880(125); Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, sec. 69, 1503; West Virginia,
Code 1937, sec. 975 (20) as amended in Laws 1939, sec. 4.
6Kentucky, Statutes (Carroll 1936) sec. 4281b-14(3).
7California, General Laws (Deering 1937), Act 8494a, sec. 3 and 1939
Suppl. Act 8494a, sec. 7(f) ; Louisiana, Gen. Stat: Supp. 1938, sec. 8587.34
(b) ; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, sec. 10,115; Montana, Rev. Code 1935, sec.
2296.
8Some states permit an allocation where income is from "business
transacted in part within and in part without" the state. Colorado, Laws
1937, ch. 175, sec. 16; Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1935, sec. 79-3202; see New
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state or entirely without the state, no problem of allocation is
raised. The entire income9 would be taxed or none.' 0  Likewise
no problem of allocation would have been raised had the com-
pany carried on a separate business'- in each of the states or had
the company's activities been of a type which could not be de-
scribed as a business or trade."°
I. ALLOCABLE INCOME
Primarily the problem of allocation is to attribute to one or
more of several business functions a portion of that net income
which results from the integrated conduct of them all. Thus,
Mexico, Laws 1933, ch. 85, sec. 31(b). A few use the phraseology trade
or business "carried on partly within and partly without" the state.
Iowa, Code 1939, sec. 6943.065(1) ; Kentucky Statutes (Carroll 1936) sec.
4281b-32(2); Maryland, Laws 1939, ch, 277, sec. 12-246(b); Minnesota,
Mason's 1940 Supplement, sec. 2394-25 (A) ; North Dakota, Compiled Laws,
Supp. 1925, sec. 2346a6(2). Others refer to "business done" within and
without the state. Georgia, Code, sec. 92, 3113(a) as amended in 1937;
Oklahoma, Statutes Supp. 1936, sec. 12498f(a); Vermont, Public Laws
1933, sec. 888. The statutes in still another group of states refer to tax-
payers "engaged in business within and without" the state. Arizona, Rev.
Code Supp., sec. 3182x; South Dakota, Code 1939, sec. 57.2707; Wisconsin,
Statutes 1939, sec. 71.02(3) (d). Finally a number of states permit an
allocation of income if derived "from sources (partly) within and (partly)
without" the state. Arkansas, Statutes (Pope 1937) sec. 14038; California,
General Laws (Deering 1937) sec. 8494(7) (f); Idaho, Code 1932, sec.
61-2416; Louisiana, Gen. Stat., Supp. 1938, sec. 8587.34(b) ; Mississippi,
Code, Supp. 1938, sec. 1614(c).9In the following states statutes provide for the taxation of the entire
net income of businesses conducted wholly within the state: Arkansas,
Statutes (Pope 1937) sec. 14038; Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 92,3113(b), as
amended in 1935; Iowa, Code 1939, sec. 6943.065(1); Kentucky, Statutes
(Carroll 1936), sec. 4281b-32 (2) ; Maryland, Laws 1939, ch. 277, sec.
12-246(b) ; Massachusetts, General Laws, ch. 63, sec. 41(d); Minnesota,
Mason's 1940 Supplement, sec. 2394-23(c); New Mexico, Laws 1933, ch.
85, sec. 31 (a); North Dakota, Compiled Laws, Supp. 1925, sec. 2346a6(2);
Pennsylvania, Purdon's Statutes supp., tit. 72, sec. 3420b; Vermont, Public
Laws 1933, sec. 888; Virginia, Tax Code, sec. 54.
lOSection 2394-23(c) of Mason's 1940 Minnesota Supplement provides
in part, "Income derived from carrying on a trade or business . . . shall
be assigned . . . to other states if conducted wholly without this
state."
"7The statutes referred to in note 8 above use the words "business"
or "trade" in the singular, and thus permit an allocation only of the in-
come from a single business. The few states which use the word "sources"
may be construed as having a similar meaning. But see Interstate Bond
Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n of Ga., (1935) 50 Ga. App. 744, 179
S. E. 559. A single business is referred to hereafter as a unitary or
integral one.
22The great majority of statutes in note 8 above refer to income from
"business' or "trade and business," thus limiting an allocation to such
types of income. Those statutes which refer to income from "sources"
within and without the state may be construed to have an equivalent
meaning. But see Interstate Bond Co. v. State Rev. Comm'n of Ga.,
(1935) 50 Ga. App. 744, 179 S. E. 559.
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the income of the manufacturing company may be said to result
from its combined manufacturing, selling, buying and managing
activities. For tax purposes this income must be split up and a
portion assigned to factory operations, a portion to selling activi-
ties, a portion to buying activities and a portion to management.
Obviously, there are no a priori rules for making this segregation.
The legislatures and the courts are guided principally by ideas of
fairness.13 The application of these ideas is restricted to the
allocation of income from an integral multi-state business. In-
come, if not derived from business, or if from a business within
one state or if from dissociated businesses in separate states,14 is
not subject to allocation. These three limitations are clear in
principle. They deserve consideration in greater detail.
A. Business Income.-Only business income may be allo-
cated. Income from personal services, from isolated sales, rentals,
royalties, interest, and dividends is assigned a taxable situs under
principles different from those controlling with respect to busi-
ness income."5 Distinctions of definition are of consequent im-
portance.
13Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
274 Fed. 975. At page 978 Judge Learned Hand said: "The case in this
aspect presents the not wholly unfamiliar difficulty of trying to apportion
quantitatively the effect of a number of factors each of which is an ab-
solute condition of the result. In such a case there is no rational solution
which will bear scrutiny, and one must proceed by a more or less rough
division not too shocking to preconceived assumptions." Pertinent to add
is a statement of Mr. Justice Holmes, "In the law we only occasionally
can reach an absolutely final and quantitative determination. . . . But
it is the essence of improvement that we should be as accurate as we can."
14The income of a taxpayer, for example, engaged in the garage busi-
ness in one state and in the grocery business in another is not subject to
allocation although the taxpayer is, in fact, engaged in business in both
states.
1-Income from personal services may, for example, be taxed in various
states. The domiciliary state may tax. State ex rel. Lerner v. Wisconsin
Tax Comm'n, (1933) 213 Wis. 267, 251 N. W. 456; Colchensky v. Okla-
homa Tax Comm'n, (1939) 184 Okla. 207, 86 P. (2d) 329; see Lawrence v.
State Tax Comm'n, (1932) 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556, 76 L. Ed.
1102, 87 A. L. R. 374 (state may tax person domiciled therein on in-
come earned in the construction of highways outside the state). Income
from personal services may also be taxed by the state in which they are
earned. Travis v. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., (1919) 252 U. S. 60, 40
Sup. Ct. 228, 64 L. Ed. 460; People ex rel. Troy v. Graves, (1937) 275
N. Y. 599, 11 N. E. (2d) 773; Hughes v. Spaeth, (1940) 207 Minn.
577, 292 N. W. 194; see Atkinson v. State Tax Comm'n, (1937) 156
Or. 461, 67 P. (2d) 161. A taxpayer residing in one state and working
in another has been taxed on the same income by both states. Hughes v.
Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1938) 227 Wis. 274, 278 N. W. 403; Dromey v.
Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1938) 227 Wis. 267, 278 N. W. 400. If the tax-
payer neither resides within the state nor earns any income within the
state during the taxable year, he is not subject to income taxes. See
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Generally the sale of an individual's time, effort or ability16
produces income -which may be described as that from personal
services. If merchandise is regularly being sold, a business income
may be said to be earned. 17 If "services" are performed by the opera-
tion of a plant, business income may likewise be said to result.' 8
A stock or real estate broker who limits his activities to the solicita-
tions of buy or sell orders is rendering personal services." 9 On
the other hand, a dealer engaged in buying and selling stock or
real estate is in business.2 0  An accounting firm which employs
several assistants on a salary basis is not engaged in business.2'
Messinger v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1936) 222 Wis. 156, 267 N. W.
535 and Hart v. Tax Comm'n, (1921) 240 Mass. 37, 132 N. E. 621;
and compare Scobie v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1937) 225 Wis. 529,
275 N. W. 531. A non-resident engaged in the rendering of personal serv-
ices within the state for a fraction of a year may be taxed on a portion of
yearly income apportioned on a time basis. Jackling v. State Tax Comm'n,
(1936) 40 N. M. 241, 58 P. (2d) 1167; or on some other reasonable
ratio such as mileage (trainmen-ruling of N. Y. Tax Comm'n June 17,
1920) in N. Y. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 15-978.13 and Op. Ky. Att.
Gen. May 24, 1940 in Ky. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-824); or
volume of business done (salesmen paid on commission basis-see various
regulations). A person who is a resident a fraction of a year may be
taxed on the portion actually earned while a resident. Greene v. Wisconsin
Tax Comm'n, (1936) 221 Wis. 531, 266 N. W. 270; Kennedy v. Com-
mission of Corp. and Tax., (1926) 256 Mass. 426, 152 N. E. 747. Or on a
portion of the yearly income apportioned on a time ratio basis. McCarty v.
Conway, (1934) 215 Wis. 645, 255 N. W. 913, 93 A. L. R. 1196 and
annotation. See Hughes v. Spaeth, (1940) 207 Minn. 577, 292 N. W.
194. With respect to isolated sales, rentals, royalties, dividends and in-
terests see notes 28 through 31 and text below.
'6The California Regulations mention as income from personal serv-
ices the income of attorneys, physicians, accountants, engineers, actors,
singers, performers, entertainers, wrestlers, boxers. Article 7 (f)-5 at
page 72 of the Regulations, Personal Income Tax Act of 1935 as amended
in 1937 in Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service par. 15-815.
'
7People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, (1921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E.
109, 15 A. L. R. 1319 (commission merchant engaged in the buying and
selling on his own credit of cotton goods assumed to be earning a business
income).
",Jorgenson-Bennett Manufacturing Co v. Knight, (1928) 156 Tenn.
579, 3 S. W. (2d) 668, 60 A. L. R. 393. (That income from "services
rendered . . . in kiln-drying, surfacing and resawing lumber" was
from business was assumed without discussion.)
"'The Wisconsin Tax Commission in 1924 ruled that a resident broker
was there taxable on income from his Chicago "business." Wisconsin
C. C. H. and P. H. Tax Services, pars. 10-809.19 and 11,119. Compare
Appeal of Kenly, (Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, March 24, 1932) Wis. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 10-813.03.
2
0 1n a ruling of the Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1926) in par. 11,157
of P. H. Wis. Tax Service it was held there must be an allocation of the
income of a taxpayer engaged in the business of selling and underwriting
bonds. See Art. 23-1 of 1940 Minnesota Regulations in Minn. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 14-725.
-1See Yalden v. Commissioner, (1930) 20 B.T.A. 372, involving
the earned income credit of an accountant under sub-sections (3) and(4) of sec. 25(a) of the Revenue Act of 1938 and prior years (capital
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On the other hand, the commissions of a general sales agent who
employs sub-agents and maintains an office constitute business
income, 22 notwithstanding the fact that the commissions of agents
are generally considered income from personal services.2 3  The
income of a general agent of a life insurance company probably
also may be considered to be from business rather than from
personal services.2 4  In some states income, to be from personal
services, must not only be derived from the performance of ser-
vices, but also must be from services with respect to which neither
capital nor labor are material income producing factors. 25  In
held not a material income producing factor where $22,062.56 of $44,838.00
gross receipts was expended for salaries. The accountant employed four
auditors, an assistant auditor, typist and other office help). See also
IX-1 C. B. 121 reaching the same result with respect to physicians and
attorneys employing assistants. In Appeal of Tower, Jr., (Nov. 9, 1938)
the Wisconsin Tax Commission ruled that a patent attorney employing
assistants on a salary or per diem basis was earning income from personal
services and not from business. Wisconsin P. H. and C. C. H. Tax Serv-
ices, pars. 13,333 and 14-547 respectively. In these cases there is an em-
phasis on the fact that the senior members, and not assistants, attract
clients. Consequently, the work of assistants is not income producing.
Compare, however, (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Feb. 27, 1924) Wis. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 10-809.18. Under the New York statute, taxing income from
a trade, business, profession or occupation the income of an accounting
firm may be allocated. Op. Atty. Gen. Sept. 23, 1920 P. H. Tax Service
par. 57,596. Likewise a non-resident attorney may be taxed on his New
York practice. Ruling (St. Comp. May 25, 1920) P. H. Tax Service par.
57,577.22people ex rel. Lummis v. Graves, (1937) 251 App. Div. 591, 297
N. Y. S. 967.
23See California Personal Income Tax Regulations of 1937, art. 7(f)
5, note 16 above; Iowa Regulations of 1938, art. 18c in Iowa C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 1469-3; Minnesota Regulations of 1940, art. 23-1, note
16 above; and Regulations of other states.
24Cerf v. Lynch, (1932) 237 App. Div. 283, 261 N. Y. S. 231; Matter
of Recht and Kutcher, (1939) 257 App. Div. 889, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 158.
(Both cases under special New York statute.) Contra: Appeal of McMillan,
(Wis. Tax Comm'n, June 11, 1936) P. H. Tax Service par. 13,220. Com-
pare Sanborn v. Commissioner, (1930) 19 B. T. A. 495. In State ex rel.
Lerner v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1933) 213 Wis. 267, 251 N. W. 456,
the court held that a taxpayer engaged in the solicitation of advertising
and other activities in connection with the publication and distribution of
year books was earning income from personal services. The court in-
dicated that the employment on a commission basis of sub-agents did not
involve "the material aid of capital."
25The Wisconsin Regulations of 1932, art. 601.2 in Wisconsin C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 10-813, provide in part, "Income from personal services
as used in our income tax law applies to income received from performing
mental or physical labor, and the fact that the capital or labor of others
is employed as an incident to rendering such services, where such capital
and labor is not a material income producing factor, will not be sufficient
to result in the classification of such income as income from business
within the meaning of the statute."
Under this regulation capital has been held to be a material income
producing factor in the case of "broker" who had capital invested in a
stock exchange seat and in carrying customers on margin. Appeal of Perry
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other states income from personal services is treated as non-
allocable notwithstanding the fact that a business in rendering
personal services may be involved in the sense that the employ-
ment of labor or capital may be material income producing fac-
tors.'" Because of the tendency under the first rule to consider
the employment of labor -7 or capital to be merely incidental, the
same result is usually achieved under either rule. This result
is that income from personal service is not allocable.
The making of isolated sales does not constitute a business.
Gains therefrom are assigned a situs for taxation under rules
different from those for the allocation of business income 28 de-
Kenly, (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Mar. 24, 1932) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 10-813.03. On the other hand neither capital nor labor were con-
sidered material income producing factors with respect to a person who
was engaged in the solicitation of advertising for year books, in the
making of arrangements for editing, printing, and publishing them, and in
their distribution and who employed sub-agents on a commission basis,
State ex rel. Lerner v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1933) 213 Wis. 267, 251
N. W. 456; nor with respect to a person who was engaged in making
traffic surveys on a "cost plus" basis. Wages were advanced to fifty em-
ployees. Appeal of Ross W. Harris, (Wis. Tax Comm'n, May 21, 1931)
Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-809.30.
-OSome states exclude from allocation "compensation for labor or
personal services, or from a business consisting principally of the per-
formance of personal or professional services." fason's 1940 Minnesota Sup-
plement, sec. 2394-23(a). Compare art. 412 and 415 of New York Per-
sonal Income Tax Regulations for 1935 in N. Y. C. C. H. Tax Service,
pars. 15-913 and 15-916 respectively.
1-7See authorities cited in note 21 above.
2-'Business income, as indicated hereafter, may be allocated by a
separate accounting or by apportionment formulas. Capital gains from
isolated sales are assigned a situs for taxation by other rules which
vary with respect to the tangible or intangible nature of the property in
question. Capital gains from the sale or exchange of tangible property,
may be taxed by the state in which such property is situated. Mason's
1940 Minnesota Supplement, sec. 2394-23(b); Wisconsin, Statutes 1939,
see. 71.02 (3) (c). Or they may be taxed by the state of the domicile of
the owner. People of the State of New York ex rel. Pierson v. Lynch,
(1933) 237 App. Div. 763, 263 N. Y. S. 259. Whether both the state
of the domicile of the owner and the situs of the property may tax the
same gains is, as yet, an undecided question. Capital gains from isolated
sales of intangible property are generally taxed by the state of the domicile
of the owner. Osgood v. Tax Comm'n, (1920) 235 Mass. 88, 126 N. E.
.71; Stone v. Tax Comm'n. (1920) 235 Mass. 93, 126 N. E. 373;
Bryant v. Tax Comm'n, (1935) 291 Mass. 498, 197 N. E. 509, 102
A. L. R. 1; Zimmers v. City of Milwaukee, (1925) 189 Wis. 269, 206
N. W. 178; Stone v. State Tax Comm'n, (1928) 197 Wis. 71, 221 N. W.
376; Appeal of Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n,
Dec. 22, 1936) P. H. Tax Service, par. 13,239. Sometimes the state of the
business situs of such intangibles imposes an income tax. See People ex
rel. Whitney v. Graves, (1937) 299 U. S. 366, 57 Sup. Ct. 237, 81 L. Ed.
285 and Hutchins v. Commission of Corp. and Tax., (1930) 272 Mass.
422, 172 N. E. 605, 71 A. L. R. 605. Whether the state of the domicile
of the obligor may tax is apparently an undecided question. Gains on
securities held by a foreign corporation which have no business situs in
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rived from sales continuously and regularly made by a person who
may be considered gainfully occupied in such activities.20
Business income is also to be distinguished from financial and
investment income such as rentals, royalties, interest and dividends
which are not generally allocable.30 A person may, however,
the state may not be taxed. Newport Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n,
(1935) 219 Wis. 293, 261 N. W. 884, 100 A. L. R. 1204. It has been
held that where a taxpayer is a resident for a fraction of a year he is
taxable only on the gains realized while a resident and not on the portion
of the annual taxable net income apportioned on a time ratio basis. Greene
v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1936) 221 Wis. 531, 266 N. W. 270. Com-
pare Scobie v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1937) 225 Wis. 529, 275 N. W.
531, which holds that the time apportionment ratio is applicable in the
absence of proof by the taxpayer as to the actual time of earning the
income.29The making of ninety-one transactions on the stock market during
one year has been held not to constitute doing business. People ex rel.
Whitney v. Loughman, (1927) 220 App. Div. 30, 220 N. Y. S. 405(statute allowed deduction of losses "incurred in trade or business"). See
also sec. 23 (a) of the federal revenue acts which allow as a deductible
expense "the ordinary and necessary expenses paid in carrying on a trade
or business," and compare Kenan v. Bowers (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 50
F. (2d) 112 and Kane v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938) 100 F.(2d) 382 with Roebling v. Commissioner, (1938) 37 B. T. A. 82. In the
latter. case the taxpayer was allowed to deduct expenses with respect to
the management of properties under her personal supervision. She owned
$9,000,000 worth of securities, purchased $517,080 worth during the taxable
year, and in the same period sold securities of the value of $38,363. In
People ex rel. General Alliance Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1938)
253 App. Div. 413, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 994, the court held the purchase by
a parent company of shares of stock in the 47 per cent owned subsidiary
did not constitute doing business under the New York act. The same
court reached the opposite result in People ex rel. Tobacco and Allied
Stocks, Inc. v. Graves, (1937) 250 App. Div. 149, 294 N. Y. S. 995,
aff'd 277 N. Y. 723, 14 N. E. (2d) 821 where the taxpayer made gross
purchases of securities in 1929 in the sum of $2,500,000, and during 1930,
1931, and 1932 made purchases of thirty-one different issues of stock and
sales of twenty-one other issues, realizing capital gains in the amount of
$225,000 and losses of $450,000; loaned money on call in the aggregate
of $300,000; had bank deposits within the state; and maintained a prin-
cipal office in New York at a yearly expense of $6,500.3ORentals may be taxed by the state in which the rental producing
property is situated. This principle was apparently assumed by the court
in Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n,(1929) 199 Wis. 368, 226 N. W. 293, and in Byram v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm'n, (1929) 199 Wis. 378, 226 N. W. 296. See Shaffer v. Carter,
(1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445. Sometimes, the
state of the domicile of the rent recipient imposes a tax. New York ex rel.
Cohn v. Graves, (1937) 300 U. S. 306, 57 Sup. Ct. 466, 81 L. Ed. 666;
108 A. L. R. 721, Palmer v. State Board of Assessment and Revue,(1939) 226 Iowa 92, 283 N. W. 415. Compare People ex rel. Beck v.
Graves, (1939) 280 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. (2d) 371. Whether both states
may tax the identical income has not, as yet, been directly the subject of
decision. As to what constitutes tangible or intangible property interests
seen Senior v. Braden, (1935) 295 U. S. 422, 55 Sup. Ct. 800, 79 L. Ed.
1520, 100 A. L. R. 794 (beneficial interest in real estate trust held to be
an-interest in realty for property tax purposes).
Royalties derived from tangible property such as mines or oil wells
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devote such a substantial portion of his time to the active and
continuous management of his investments that he may be con-
are generally taxed by the state of the location of the royalty producing
property. For example, see sec. 71.02 (3) (c) of the Wisconsin Statutes
which provides in part, "Income derived from rentals and royalties from
real estate or tangible personal property . . . shall follow the situs of
the property from which derived." Under an earlier Wisconsin law royal-
ties from leases to mines outside the state were taxed to residents. Pfister
Land Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (1917) 166 Wis. 223, 165 N. W. 23.
Compare the cases above involving the situs of rents. Royalties derived
from intangibles such as patents and copyrights are assigned a situs for
income taxation under rules similar to those with respect to dividends and
interest which are discussed below. Such royalties have been taxed by the
state of the royalty recipient. People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, (1936) 242
App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y. S. 582, aff'd without opinion 270 N. Y. 498,
200 N. E. 288; Laabs v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1933) 218 Wis. 414,
261 N. W. 404. The state of the source may also tax. See Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, (1931) 286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 76 L. Ed.
1010 (motion picture royalties taxed by state in which pictures were ex-
hibited) and Rafael Sabatini v. Commission (C.C.A. 1938) 98 F. (2d)
753 (copyright royalties taxed by state in which royalty payor sold books).
The state of the business situs of the patents may tax royalties therefrom.
Appeal of Aluminum Manufacturing Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Aug. 21,
1939) P. H. Wis. Tax Service, par. 13,428. Whether both the state of
the source and of the domicile may tax the same income has not, as yet,
been expressly decided.
Interest is generally taxed by the state of the domicile of the recipient.
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves above; State v. Weil, (1936) 232 Ala.
578, 168 So. 679, aff'd on second appeal 237 Ala. 293, 186 So. 467. Taxa-
tion by the state of the obligor has been disallowed as a matter of statutory
construction in State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm'n, (1915) 161 Wis. 111, 152 N. W. 848, and as a matter of due
process in Domenech v. United Porto Rican Sugar, Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir.
1932) 62 F. (2d) 552, but in Mississippi Cottonseed Products Co. v.
Stone, (1939) 184 Miss. 409, 184 So. 428 such taxation was allowed both
as a matter of construction and presumably as a matter of due process.
It has been allowed as a matter of jurisdictional power. United States
v. Erie., (1882) 106 U. S. 327, 1 Sup. Ct. 223, 27 L. Ed. 151; Helvering v.
Stockholm Enskilda Bank, (1934) 293 U. S. 84, 55 Sup. Ct. 50, 79
L. Ed. 211. Taxation by the state of the business situs has long been
recognized. DeGanay v. Lederer, (1919) 250 U. S. 376, 39 Sup. Ct. 524,
63 L. Ed. 1042; Hill v. Carter, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 869,
cert. den. 284 U. S. 625, 52 Sup. Ct 10, 76 L. Ed. 532. A taxpayer
domiciled within a state for only a fraction of the taxable year may be
taxed on the portion received while so domiciled. Ewa Plantation v.
Wilder, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 289 F. 664; Martin v. Gage, (1934) 281
Ky. 95, 134 S. W. (2d) 966; Kennedy v. Commission of Corp. and Tax.,
(1926) 256 Mass. 426, 152 N. E. 747. The portion may be computed on
a time ratio basis. McCarty v. Conway, (1934) 215 Wis. 645, 255 N. W.
913, 93 A. L. R. 1196.
Dividends are generally taxed by the state of the domicile of the
dividend recipient. Conner v. State, (1925) 82 N. H. 126, 130 Atl. 357;
Lapham v. Tax Comm'r, (1923) 244 Mass. 40, 138 N. E. 708; State v.
Weil, (1936) 232 Ala. 578, 168 So. 679, aff'd on second appeal 237 Ala.
293, 186 So. 467; State ex rel. Dulaney v. Nygaard, (1921) 174 Wis. 597,
183 N. W. 884; Wiseman v. Interstate Public Service Co., (1935) 191
Ark. 255, 85 S. W. (2d) 700. The state of the business situs of the
dividend producing securities may tax. DeGanay v. Lederer, (1919) 250
U. S. 376, 39 Sup. Ct. 524, 63 L. Ed. 1042; see First Bank Stock Corpora-
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sidered to be in a business in which both capital and labor are
material income producing factors. 31  Frequently the same tax-
tion v. Minnesota, (1937) 301 U. S. 234, 57 Sup. Ct. 677, 81 L. Ed. 1061;
State ex rel. Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Phelps, (1920) 172 Wis. 147, 176
N. W. 863, and Appeal of Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Co., (Wis.
Tax Comm'n, Aug. 21, 1939) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-809.32
and par. 14-627. It is apparently undecided whether the state of incorpora-
tion of the dividend payor has due process power to tax. See Corry v.
Baltimore, (1904) 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297, 49 L. Ed. 556 permit-
ting a property tax on shares of a domestic corporation. Arkansas pur-
ports to tax such income. Arkansas, Statutes (Pope 1937) secs. 14026(b)
and 14038.1. The state of incorporation of the dividend payor has juris-
dictional power to tax. Bence v. United States, (1937) 84 Ct. Cl. 605, 18
F. Supp. 848; Op. Cal. Att. Gen. No. 10,207, Sept. 13, 1935 in Cal.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 15,818.21. There is a conflict of opinion with
respect to the power of the state of the business domicile to tax. Such
power was granted in Southeast Power and Light Co. v. McCarroll,
(Ark. 1940) 140 S. W. (2d) 1001 where the due process clause was in-
volved, and in Lord Forres v. Commission, (1932) 25 B. T. A. 154
where the jurisdictional power of the United States was involved. The
power was denied as a matter of due process in Newport Co. v. Wis-
consin Tax Commission, (1935) 219 Wis. 293, 261 N. W. 884, 100 A. L. R.
1204 (tax on capital gains) and in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Doughton, (1926) 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256, 70 L. Ed. 475, 43
A. L. R. 1374 (inheritance tax). See also California Packing Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93 P. (2d) 463. With respect to
dividends received by a taxpayer domiciled within the taxing state for
only a portion of the year see Martin v. Gage, (1934) 281 Ky. 95, 134
S. W. (2d) 966; Kennedy v. Commission, (1926) 256 Mass. 426, 152
N. E. 747; and McCarty v. Conway, (1934) 215 Wis. 645, 255 N. W.
913, 93 A. L. R. 1196.
A beneficiary's income from a trust has been taxed by the state of
the domicile of the recipient. Guarantee Trust Co., Executor v. Virginia,
(1938) 305 U. S. 19, 59 Sup. Ct. 1, 83 L. Ed. 16. Compare Safe Deposit
and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, (1929) 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct.
59, 74 L. Ed. 180, 64 A. L. R. 386 with Maguire v. Trefry, (1920) 253
U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, 64 L. Ed. 739. The beneficiary has also been
taxed by the state of the administration of the trust. See DeGanay v.
Lederer, (1919) 250 U. S. 376, 39 Sup. Ct. 524, 63 L. Ed. 1042. The
same income has been taxed by both states. Guarantee Trust Co. v.
Virginia, (1938) 305 U. S. 19, 59 Sup. Ct. 1, 83 L. Ed. 16.
3lRentals: Compare Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 107,
31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1312 (various taxpayers
"engaged in such activities as leasing property, collecting rents, managing
office buildings, making investments of profits, or leasing ore lands and
collecting royalties, managing wharves, dividing profits, and in some cases
investing the surplus" held to be "engaged in business" within the meaning
of an excise tax on the doing of business measured by net income-p. 171)
and Frothingham Buildings v. Commonwealth, (1924) 249 Mass. 290, 144
N. E. 229 (the leasing of a building, collecting of rents, management of
the properties and investment of certain securities held "doing business"
for excise tax purposes) with Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, (1911)
220 U. S. 187, 31 Sup. Ct. 361, 55 L. Ed. 428 (a corporation, divested of
all power to manage or control properties held not to be doing business
by receiving rentals from lessee and distributing them to shareholders)
and Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, (1924) 112 Or. 314, 228 Pac. 812
(receipts of rentals from property outside the state held not to constitute
doing business for income tax purposes).
Royalties: With respect to the Clark Iron Co. in Flint v. Stone Tracy
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payer may earn both a business and an investment income. Oper-
ating statements often reflect this in segregating operating and
non-operating income. In these situations that portion of the
taxpayer's income which is derived from investments not em-
ployed in connection with business32 and not allocable3" must be
separated from business income allocable by apportionment or
Co., (1910) 220 U. S. 107, 170, 171, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, and
in Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., (1917) 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct.
201, 61 L. Ed. 460, the court held that the leasing and management of ore
lands and collection of royalties therefrom constituted doing business under
business excise tax acts. In Quicksafe Mfg. Corp. v. Graham, (1930) 161
Tenn. 46, 29 S. W. (2d) 253, the court held, in part, that the receipt of
patent royalties did not constitute doing business for excise tax purposes.
Interest: State v. Weil, (1936) 232 Ala. 578, 168 So. 679, aff'd on
second appeal 237 Ala. 293, 186 So. 467 (interest -income held non-
allocable); Beneficial Loan Society of Oregon v. State Tax Comm'n,
(1939) 163 Or. 211, 95 P. (2d) 429 (interest income from a small loan
company held to be from business and allocable by apportionment formula) ;
and Interstate Bond Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga. App.
744, 179 S. E. 559 (interest income held earned from business carried on
entirely within the state). The interest income of a finance company has
been held to be allocable by apportionment. In the Matter of the Appeal
of Marcus-Lisome, Inc., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) in Cal.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801.005.
Dividends: Compare Edwards v. Chile Copper Co., (1925) 270 U. S.
452, 46 Sup. Ct. 345, 70 L. Ed. 678 and Phillips v. International Salt
Company, (1927) 274 U. S. 718, 47 Sup. Ct. 589, 71 L. Ed. 1323 reversing
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 389 (on particular facts of each case
the holding of stock and receipt of dividends was held to constitute doing
business for purposes of business excise tax) with Rose v. Nunnally Invest-
ment Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 102; and Eaton v. Phoenix
Securities Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 497 (reaching opposite
result on slightly different facts); with Welch Holding Co. v. Gallaway,
(1939) 161 Or. 515, 89 P. (2d) 559 (taxpayer held "merely a conduit" for
passing the profits of the operating companies to the shareholders of the
taxpayer) ; and with People ex rel. Butterick Co. v. Gilchrist, (1925) 213
App. Div. 535, 211 N. Y. S. 75. See also note 34 below.
32Section 23 of the Minnesota Act (note 8 above) uses the phrase
"employed in business" and sec. 17 of the Colorado Act (note 8 above),
the phrase "received in connection with business." Other statutes are of
like purport. See note 33 below.
33In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1937) 145
Kan. 715, 68 P. (2d) 1 the court held that no part of a $16,007,413.71 divi-
dend and interest income was "received in connection with business" in
Kansas. The stocks and bonds from which the income in question was
derived were not controlled or managed from Kansas nor were they
physically situated there. Accord: California Packing Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93 P. (2d) 463; Appeal of the Great Northern
Railway Co., (Cal. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 5-553.04. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton, (1923) 262
U. S. 413, 43 Sup. Ct. 620, 67 L. Ed. 1051, where a North Carolina statute
levying a three per cent tax on "net operating income" was upheld against
constitutional objections that the statute failed to take into account both
non-operating income in the form of dividends, interest and rentals re-
ceived and non-operating expenses in the form of interest and rentals paid.
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separate accounting.3 4  Conversely, income from securities or
properties employed in connection with business must be con-
sidered part of business income and allocated therewith.3
B. An Integral Business.-Income derived from business
activities carried on in more than one state may be allocated only
if these activities are parts of an integral whole. If any part, con-
fined to the limits of one state, should be considered a dissociated
unit the income therefrom would not be subject to allocation.
Or if this dissociated business is carried on in several states there
is an allocation, but only of the separate income. Definition is
thus necessary in order, in some instances, to determine whether
or not an allocation is to be made and in others to determine the
unit of income subject thereto.
An integral business is not subject to precise definition. Mr.
Justice Holmes has suggested that its chief characteristic is that
value attributable to combination. 3 6  A familiar example of this
34A situation in which there may be a conflict of authority with respect
to the distinction between operating and financial income is that in
which a parent company holds stock of and receives income from its sub-
sidiary or subsidiaries. See State v. National Cash Credit Association,
(1932) 224 Ala. 629, 141 So. 541, where it was held that the ownership
by a parent company of stock and bonds in its subsidiaries did not con-
stitute doing business; and compare National Leather Co. v. Massachusetts,
(1928) 277 U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 534, 72 L. Ed. 935 where it was held
that the stock of subsidiaries owned by the parent company were "employed
in... business within the Commonwealth." See also Atlantic Lumber Co.
v. Commission of Corp. and Tax., (1934) 2 Mass. B. T. A. 67, aff'd on
other grounds 292 Mass. 51, 197 N. E. 525, and 298 U. S. 553, 56 Sup. Ct.
887, 80 L. Ed. 1328, where a different result was reached, apparently be-
cause the subsidiaries were outside rather than inside the state as in the
earlier case. In Stanley Works v. Hackett, (1937) 122 Conn. 547, 190 At.
743, the court held that shares in Canadian subsidiaries owned by a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal office in Connecticut were employed
in connection with the Canadian business. Compare also Fargo v. Hart,(1903) 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498, 48 L. Ed. 791 (holding that owner-
ship of bonds and real estate by an express company was not an integral
part of its business) with Illinois Central Railway v. Green, (1917) 244
U. S. 555, 37 Sup. Ct. 697, 61 L. Ed. 1309 (holding that stock of sub-
sidiary railways kept in the treasury of the parent company was, in the
absence of proof by the taxpayer to the contrary, part of the business
properties of the parent company.)
35 See cases cited in note 31 above and cases involving the business
situs of intangibles cited in articles in (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 407, 420-430
and (1922) 28 W. Va. L. Q. 89. The North Carolina attorney general on
Aug. 5, 1924 ruled that interest from bank deposits employed in business
both within and without the state was allocable with business income.
Biennial Report 1922-24, p. 209, N. C. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-812.01.
36In Fargo v. Hart, (1903) 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498, 48 L. Ed.
791, Mr. Justice Holmes first stated at page 501 that "The express business
added nothing to the value of the bonds in New York' and then went on to
show that the bonds added nothing to the value of the express business in
Indiana.
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occurs in those business enterprises which possess, above the actual
value of their properties, a going concern value attributable to the
high rate of return earned by reason of central ownership and
management.3 7  Under the rule of value business properties and
3 7The history of the "unit rule" presents an interesting development.
It was first formulated with respect and applied to businesses in which
there was present a physical unity of contiguous property. Chief examples
of such businesses have been railroads; (State Railroad Tax Cases, (1875)
92 U. S. 575, 608, 23 L. Ed. 663, 671. "The track of the road is but one
track from one end of it to the other, and except in its use as a track, is of
little value;" Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Backus, (1894) 154 U. S. 421,
14 Sup. Ct. 1114, 38 L. Ed. 1031. Both cases upheld an apportionment of
total going concern value on a mileage ratio. Wallace v. Hines, (1920)
253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435, 64 L. Ed. 782 voided a mileage ratio as ap-
plied to the particular facts of the case. The mileage ratio was approved
with respect to income taxes in Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. State,
(1935) 297 U. S. 682, 56 Sup. Ct. 625, 80 L. Ed. 977); telegraph com-
panies (Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, (1888) 125 U. S.
530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961, 31 L. Ed. 790; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Tag-
gart, (1896) 163 U. S. 1, 16 Sup. Ct. 1054, 41 L. Ed. 49. The statutes
in both cases taxed a mileage proportion of total going concern value);
telephone companies (see 2 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) secs. 811 and
813) ; pipe line companies (see Tide Water Pipe Co. v. State Bd., (1895)
57 N. J. L. 516, 31 Atl. 220, 27 L. R. A. 684 aff'd on op'n below, 59
N. J. L. 269, 39 Atl. 1114, gross receipts tax) ; interstate toll bridge com-
panies (Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, (1897) 166 U. S. 150, 17
Sup. Ct. 532, 41 L. Ed. 953-value of going concern apportioned on ratio
of length of bridge within the state to total length of bridge) ; power com-
panies (State ex rel. Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Baker, (1927)
316 Mo. 853, 293 S. W. 399, total property was apportioned on wire mile-
age basis) ; and water companies (Berger Aqueduct Co. v. State Board of
Taxes, (1921) 95 N. J. L. 486, 112 Atl. 881-business excise tax measured
on a water main mileage proportion of gross receipts).
Later a unity of use became the standard. Under this rule the prin-
cipal taxpayers were express companies (Adams Express Co. v. Ohio
State Auditor, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 222, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683.
"The unit is a unit of use and management, and the horses, wagons, safes,
pouches and furniture--possessed a value in combination-") ; refrigerator
car companie3 (see American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, (1899)
174 U. S. 70, 19 Sup. Ct. 599, 43 L. Ed. 899 and Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Lynch, (1900) 177 U. S. 149, 20 Sup. Ct. 631, 44 L. Ed. 708) ; tank
car companies (Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, (1919) 249 U. S. 275,
39 Sup. Ct. 276, 63 L. Ed. 602-ratio of total miles of track within the
state over which cars ran to total mileage everywhere held unconstitutional.
Later car mileage ratios were adopted) ; sleeping car companies (Pullman's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1891) 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876, 35
L. Ed. 613); and steamship lines (Schwab v. Richardson, (1923) 263
U. S. 88, 44 Sup. Ct. 60, 68 L. Ed. 183 and Commissioners v. Old Dominion
S. S. Co., (1901) 128 N. C. 558, 39 S. E. 18). The rule of unity of use
was not held to include manufacturing concerns. Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683.
The court said at page 222 "The same party may own a manufacturing
establishment in one state and a store in another, and make profit by operat-
ing the two, but the worth of each is separate." See Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.
v. Salt Lake County, (1922) 60 Utah 491, 210 Pac. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874.
Later, however, the rule finally emerged as one of value and was applied
to manufacturing concerns by the United States Supreme Court in the
series of decisions cited in notes 38 through 43 below. The above dictum
may, therefore, be considered overruled.
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organizations having a value in combination in excess of the total
of separate values would be considered to be integral. Thus
it has been held that a glue company with sales activities and
offices without the taxing state together with a factory and prin-
cipal office within the taxing state was engaged in an integral
business.38 The same result has been reached in the case of a
typewriter company, the principal office of which, together with its
sales organization and branches, was outside the taxing state and
its factory within the taxing state ;S9 in the case of a leather tan-
ning business the warehouse of which, together with its branch and
principal sales offices, was located outside the taxing state and its
tanning factory within the taxing state ;40 and in the case of a
coffee company 99.8 per cent of sales of which were made out-
side the taxing state and the production plant of which was
within the taxing state.41 Similarly, when the question of taxation
has arisen in the state of the location of the branch sales and
import offices of an ale company, the brewery, situated outside the
taxing state, has been considered an integral part of the entire
enterprise.42 Also a company with factories located in several
different states, as well as with multi-state sales branches, has been
considered to be engaged in an integral enterprise.43 On the other
hand, silverware and munitions businesses owned and managed
by the same taxpayer have been considered to be dissociated
enterprises. 44  Here, apparently, neither business would enhance
the value of the other. Under certain circumstances oil wells
38United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, (1917) 247 U. S.
321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135.
39Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, (1920) 254 U. S. 113,
41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165.
4OHans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, (1930) 283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct.
385, 75 L. Ed. 879.
,"State ex rel. Maxwell v. Kent Coffey Mfg. Co., (1933) 204 N. C.
365, 168 S. E. 397, 90 A. L. R. 476, aff'd per curiam, (1934) 291 U. S. 642,
54 Sup. Ct. 437, 78 L. Ed. 1040.
42Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Comm'n, (1924) 266 U. S.
271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82, 69 L. Ed. 282.
• 3North American Cement Corp. v. Graves, (1936) Per curiam decisions
in 243 App. Div. 834, 278 N. Y. S. 920; 269 N. Y. 507, 199 N. E. 510; 299
U. S. 517, 57 Sup. Ct. 311, 81 L. Ed. 381. Facts stated in Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, (Cal. 1941) 111 P. (2d) 334, 339.
44Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. Travis, (S.D. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed.
975, aff'd (1924) 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279 (dictum at
page 979 by Judge Hand that "the taxpayer must have the right to show
that parts of the foreign assets are not functionally connected with the
local business.") A more obvious situation might be that of a taxpayer
engaged in both the grocery and garage businesses. If these were each
carried in different states there would be no allocation of the combined
income. The separate incomes would be separately taxed in each state.
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separately operated in separate states by the same taxpayer have
been held separate, integral units.45 Also, a taxpayer engaged both
in the business of operating its plant and of managing its invest-
ments may perhaps be considered to be engaged in two separate
businesses."0
Although the presence of a common ownership is one of the
factors to be considered in ascertaining whether or not an integral
business is being carried on, it is not of itself determinative. Some-
times diversity of ownership may be ignored if there is a unity of
value.1 7  Likewise, a unity of management is not determinative
4 5State ex rel. Attorney General v. Lion Oil Refining Co., (1926) 171
Ark. 209, 284 S. V. 33, involving a property tax on corporate excess, indi-
cated there was no organic unity between the taxpayer's operations in
Arkansas in drilling for and refining oil, and its similar operations carried
on in other states. The court said, "Each one would be separately oper-
ated and might be shut down without any impairment of the operating
power of its plants in the other two states." See Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.
v. Salt Lake County, (1922) 60 Utah 491, 210 Pac. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874,
involving a property tax on the corporate excess of a beet sugar company
engaged "in the production, manufacture and sale of beet sugar." It had
sugar factories in several states.
"10Fargo v. Hart, (1903) 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498, 48 L. Ed. 791.
This case involk ed a tax upon the property within Indiana of the American
Express Company. The value of the property was taken to be a mileage
proportion of the going concern value of the total assets of the company.
The Express Co. had real estate of a market value of $2,000,000 and
securities of a worth of $15,000,000, neither of which was employed in its
express business. The securities were apparently employed in its banking
business. The assessment was held improper to the extent that the value
of dissociated properties was included. Coulter v. Weir, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1904) 127 Fed. 897 reached the same result on almost identical facts involv-
ing the Adams Express Co., a taxpayer similarly situated. It should be
noted that under income tax laws a result similar to that in the last two
cases above might sometimes be reached on the theory that income from
real estate and securities was investment rather than business income. See
notes 30 through 33 above.
-17Sometimes this is done by looking through the "corporate fiction;"
or under anti-evasion sections of income tax statutes; or under consolidated
return provisions thereof. Palmolive Co. v. Conway, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1932) 56 F. (2d) 83; Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (C.C.A. 7th
Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 801; Cliffs Chemical Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n,
(1927) 193 Vis. 295, 214 N. W. 447; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Gilpatrick, (1922)
98 Conn. 192, 118 Atl. 919; In re Morton Salt Co., (1939) 150 Kan. 650,
95 P. (2d) 335. Cf. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, (1926) 244 N. Y. 114,
155 N. E. 6S; Curtis Companies Inc. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1933)
214 Wis. 85, 251 N. W. 497, 92 A. L. R. 1065; Procter and Gamble Co. v.
Newton, (S.D. N.Y. 1923) 289 Fed. 1013; Application of Marke &
Hammacher, (1940) 258 App. Div. 363, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 774, and McCrary
Co. v. Commission of Corp. and Taxation, (1932) 280 Mass. 273, 182
N. E. 481. In Palmolive Co. v. Conway, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 56 F. (2d)
83, the fact that an advertising agency was separately incorporated appar-
ently persuaded the court that the placing of advertising was not part of an
integral business. Prima facie, it would seem that the placing of advertising
would add value to the rest of the business in increased sales. See In re
Kansas City Star Co., (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 1029. For a lucid
article concerning the effect of intercorporate organization on allocation see
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even in those cases in which it is coupled with a unity of owner-
ship.4" The fact that separate divisions of the same business are
operated as independent accounting units does not conclusively
show that separate businesses are involved,49 even though such
accounting methods may be determinative of the unit of business
for which a separate accounting may be had. Although there was
some uncertainty in the early cases50 between the concept of the
Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract, (1931) 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 935. In Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Greene, (1917) 244 U. S. 555, 37 Sup.
Ct. 697, 61 L. Ed. 1309 and in Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, (E.D. Ky.
1925) 12 F. (2d) 802 it was held that a unity of ownership was prima facie
evidence of a unity of value.
48Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. Query, (E.D. S.C. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 172
held two unconnected railroad lines, separately located in two different
states, to be separate integral units even though owned and managed by
the same taxpayer. On the facts, the operation of the railroad in South
Carolina might not have added any appreciable value to the railway operated
in North Carolina. There was no showing that a single management of the
two lines effected any appreciable saving. See also Burkhart Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Coale, (1940) 345 Mo. 1131, 139 S. W. (2d) 502, holding that a
company with separate factories and sales forces in three different states
all subject to a central "directory control" did not, with respect to sales
from out of state factories, make transactions partly within the state. A
sales ratio allocation of the company's income from all sources was made.
Compare McCrary Co. v. Commission, (1932) 280 Mass. 273, 182 N. E.
481, where the retail stores of the chain taxpayer were separately incor-
porated, being subsidiaries of the parent which acted as the general pur-
chasing agent for all its branches. Each retail store was charged a 10
per cent commission for such services. A unity of value might here seem
to be present. The court decided to the contrary, however, on the grounds
of separate ownership.
49See Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, (E.D. Ky. 1925) 12 F. (2d)
802 and cases cited in notes 38 to 43 inclusive above.
5OFisher v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 744;
Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 708. Both
cases involved North Dakota income taxes on the same taxpayer, which
was engaged in the production, refining, transportation and sale of petroleum
and its by-products in various states of the Union. The taxpayer in each
case had "sales outlets" in North Dakota. In the first case the court said
at page 747: "Theories of allocation can have no place in the inquiry, if net
income from within the state stands on its own footing unmixed with outside
business." It concludes, however, at page 747, "We think appellee's busi-
ness within the state is easily separable from its other business by charging
it with the wholesale price of its products which it sells in North Dakota.
That would put it on an equality there with those who sell and do not
produce and refine." In the later case on the other hand, the court dis-
allowed the additional assessments in question-on the ground that the sales
business was of "different character" from the businesses of producing and
refining oil, and quoted with approval the dictum in Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683, set forth at the
end of note 37 above. It added: "It is conceded to be a very easy matter
for the state to determine the market value of refined oils within its
borders at any time and place, and on this, having ascertained the selling
price, to determine the tax necessary to be paid." The dictum of Chief
Justice Fuller in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 17
Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683, was also the basis, perhaps unfortunately, of
another decision involving the "unit rule" in Standard Oil Co. v. Howe,
ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS INCOME
integral business unit and the concept of a separate accounting
unit, recent cases all take cognizance of the fact that there may
be various accounting units of the same integral enterprise.51
C. A Multi-State Business.-Sometimes a taxpayer may carry
on an integral business in more than one state. A multi-state
business 2 is then done and an allocation is to be made.52a Or a
taxpayer may carry on an integral business within one state.
Here there is no problem of allocation but a preliminary one of
determining whether the entire business is done within the state.5 3
More specifically, there must be decision with respect to whether
or not the operation of a factory outside the state, or the conduct
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1919) 257 F. 481. The North Dakota supreme court
recently has construed the North Dakota statute in question as one probably
involving a separate accounting unit rather than a unit of integral business.
Ford Motor Co. v. State, (1935) 65 N. D. 316, 258 N. W. 596.
5
"Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1929) 197
Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85 (on facts practically identical with those involved
in the North Dakota taxes in the note above, the court held the taxpayer
entitled to a separate accounting) and cases cited in notes 219 to 249 below.
52The distinction here made betveen a multi-state business on the one
hand and business within one state on the other is not the same as that
between interstate and intrastate commerce within the meaning of the
federal constitution. An interstate business may, for the purpose of alloca-
tion, be considered to be carried on entirely within one state. See Hump
Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, (1922) 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 805,
66 L. Ed. 622. Conversely, there may be a multi-state business where,
for the purposes of the commerce clause, an intrastate business would be
carried on in each of several states. Save for one or two early decisions
commerce clause precedent has not been followed in allocation cases. See
cases collected in the footnotes. In Converse v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 959, the court construed the phrase
"within the state" to include only intrastate business. Contrast Matson
Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization, (1935) 3 Cal. (2d) 1, 43 P.
(2d) 805, aff'd 297 U. S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 553, 80 L. Ed. 791 ("business
done within the state"); Norfolk and Western R. Co. v. N. C. ex rel.
Maxwell, (1935) 208 N. C. 397, 181 S. E. 248, aff'd 297 U. S. 682, 56
Sup. Ct. 625, 80 L. Ed. 977 (detailed statutory provision) ; and Op. Tenn.
Att. Gen. Feb. 25, 1939 in Tenn. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-502. In
Temple v. Gates, (1933) 186 Ark. 820, 56 S. W. (2d) 417, the court said:
"The transaction between it [the taxpayer] and the citizens of this state
were interstate in nature and character" and held the business in question
not to be "carried on in this state." Other grounds for decision were
presented on the facts. The limitation should be borne in mind, however,
that a franchise tax upon the doing of business measured by net income
may be, generally speaking, subject to the usual commerce clause restrictions
upon franchise taxes. With respect to interstate commerce see note 103
below.52aTlie burden of showing the existence of a multi-state business is
on the taxpayer. Appeal of Moore Dry Goods Co., Inc., (Cal. St. Bd. of
Equal., Nov. 9, 1936) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.02.
53Economically, the problem is to decide whether the income of the
business is earned in its entirety within the state. If the economic and
legal problems are to coincide, the statutory phrase "doing business" and
the economic phrase "earning business income," must be considered to be
equivalent. For statutory provisions see notes 4 through 11 above and text.
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of buying activities outside the state, or the location of manage-
ment outside the state, or the solicitation of sales through agents
or branches outside the state, or the performance of any one of
several other business functions54 constitute doing business or, in
economic terms, the performance of an income producing fdnction
outside the state. If in any instance it does, an allocation is to be
made. If it does not, there is none.
It is generally accepted that the operation of a manufacturing
plant constitutes doing business, and that some portion of the
final net income may be attributed to the factory." There capital
and labor are employed in combination for profit. Apparently
some stress is laid on this fact of combination, for the presence
outside the state of property alone56 or the employment outside
the state of labor alone 57 have not either, as yet, been considered
doing business. This result, perhaps, would not seem fully
accurate to an economist who, quite probably, 58 would attribute
some portion, however small, of the business income to each of the
two separate factors. Should a case arise on stronger facts, the
54The October 1939 Report of the Committee of the National Tax
Association on Allocation of Income at page 29 suggests the following
additional functions in earning manufacturing income: Extracting, assem-
bling, storing, research and design, credits, collecting, transporting, account-
ing, financing, and general administration.
55Cases cited in notes 38 to 43 inclusive.
5OAppeal of California Despatch Line, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Mar. 10,
1938) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801a.03 (business of renting tank
cars held to be done in its entirety within California notwithstanding
presence of cars outside the state there operated by lessees) ; Appeal of
Kasser Egg Process Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Mar. 14, 1933) Cal.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.05 (business of renting machines held to
be done in its entirety within California notwithstanding the presence outside
the state of the machines there controlled by the lessees.) On the facts of
these cases it would not seem that the taxpayer, if a foreign corporation,
would find it necessary to qualify to do business in the outside states nor
would it find itself subject to process there. Possibly, if the property out-
side the state was subject to the taxpayer's control and operation, a different
result would be reached.
57The employment of labor outside the state in making deliveries there
has been held not to constitute doing extra-state business. Ruling (Wis.
Tax Comm'n, Jan. 25, 1926) 411, Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-809.07;
see Op. Tenn. Att. Gen. March 1, 1939. Tenn. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
4-010. Labor of travelling salesmen expended outside the state does not
there localize the sales income resulting from their efforts. See cases
note 90 below. There would probably be no jurisdictional power to impose
or collect the tax. See note 59 below.
5sNot the least of the difficulties facing the courts in this field of
allocation is the apparent absence of well established principles of economics
or accounting determining the place at which specific items of income are
earned. See report of the Committee of the National Tax Association on
Allocation of Income (October 1939) at pages 13 and 16.
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law may accord the economist's position legal recognition. To
date it has not.59
Processing and assembling also constitute doing business at the
location of the respective processing"' or assembly"' plants, and
part of the final net income is there earned. A transportation
company is doing business and earning income where its facilities
are located. 2  So again a business is done and income earned at
the well0 3 or mine64 from which oil or minerals are extracted.
Economically speaking, some portion of the income of a busi-
ness should probably be attributed to the performance of the
accounting function, to the financing of the business, to collections,
to research and design and to storage. Here again legal recogni-
tion of the economist's probable position is lacking, as are also
decisions with respect to factual situations in which that view-
point might more forcefully be presented. It has been held that
where a "business is transacted and located without the state,
excepting incidental management from and accounting" within
the state, the income therefrom is earned in its entirety without
5OA taxpayer should be considered to be doing business where, eco-
nomically speaking, it earns income subject to the limitation that a situs
for taxation of income should not be assigned to a state without power to
tax that income. Compare Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
(1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150 (holding that Kentucky
could not tax to a domestic corporation property outside the state) with
Southern Pacific Company v. Kentucky, (1911) 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct.
13, 56 L. Ed. 96 (holding the reverse where property outside the state could
not be taxed elsewhere and would escape taxation unless Kentucky could
tax).
GoSee United States Rubber Products v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
(1939) 189 S. C. 386, 1 S. E. (2d) 153 and Jorgensen-Bennett Mfg. Co. v.
Knight, (1928) 156 Tenn. 579, 3 S. E. (2d) 668, 60 A. L. R. 393.
61See Ford Motor Company v. Beauchamp, (1939) 308 U. S. 331, 60
Sup. Ct. 273, 84 L. Ed. 304.
62Railways: Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. State, (1935) 297 U. S.
682, 56 Sup. Ct. 625, 80 L. Ed. 977; Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. Query,
(E.D. S.C. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 172; Union Pacific Railway Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, (1937) 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. (2d) 1; and Op. Tenn. Att. Gen. Feb.
25, 1939, Tenn. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-502 (income of railway all of the
properties of which were within the state was taxed in its entirety in the
state). Steamships: See Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equal-
ization, (1935) 3 Cal. (2d) 1, 43 P. (2d) 805, aff'd 297 U. S. 441, 56
Sup. Ct. 553, 80 L. Ed. 791. Bits Lines: Ops. Tenn. Att. Gen. April 20,
1939, C. C. H. Tenn. Tax Service, pars. 4-008 and 4-007. Pipe Lines:
Oklahoma Pipe Line Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, (W.D. Okl. 1940) 33
F. Supp. 294 (income of pipeline company all of the properties of which
were within the state was taxed in its entirety within the state).
63Shaffer v. Carter, (1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed.
445; Shaffer v. Howard, (E.D. Okl. 1918) 250 Fed. 873, reversed on other
grounds 249 U. S. 200, 39 Sup. Ct. 255, 63 L. Ed. 559.
64State ex rel. Mariner v. Hampel, (1920) 172 Wis. 67, 178 N. W.
244; Cottonwood Coal Co. v. Junod, (1935) 73 Mont. 392, 236 Pac. 1080.
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the state ;65 that the maintenance of a bank account outside the
state does not constitute doing business outside the state;86 that
making collections outside the state does not constitute doing
business there ;67 that the employment of research men in science 8
or design does not constitute doing business; and that the main-
tenance of warehouses outside the state does not constitute doing
business,6 9 as well as the reverse.7 1 In this last situation those
6 5United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, (1915) 161 Wis.
211, 219, 153 N. W. 241, 244, Ann. Cases 1918A 421, aff'd 249 U. S. 32,
38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135.66Cottonwood Coal Co. v. Junod, (1935) 73 Mont. 392, 236 Pac. 1080.
Here argument was made to the court that the taxpayer by "sending money
for deposit in banks in St. Paul, receiving interest on its bank balances and
interest on Liberty bonds, and disbursing these funds in that city, . . . was
'engaged in business' within the state of Minnesota." The Montana court
held it was not. In a ruling of the Wis. Tax Comm'n of Jan. 2, 1924,
888 (Wis. C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 10-809.01) it was held that a foreign
corporation doing nothing in Wisconsin other than the keeping of money on
deposit in banks in the state and paying its bills by check thereon was not
doing business nor earning income in Wisconsin. Where, however, the
taxpayer is engaged in several activities within the state the presence of a
bank account may, as one factor among several, be taken into consideration
in determining whether or not the taxpayer is there engaged in business.
Laurentide Co. v. Durey, (N.D. N.Y. 1916) 231 Fed. 223 ("... . it collected
such checks in the United States and deposited the proceeds to its own
credit in its own bank account in the United States . . ." at p. 228);
People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, (1921) 195 App. Div. 635, 187 N. Y. S.
311, rev'sd on other grounds 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109, 15 A. L. R. 1319("all of his activities, his banking and capital, are in New York.") Carlos
Ruggles Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, (1927) 261 Mass. 450, 158 N. E.
899 ("The petitioner deposited money in banks here and received interest
on the same.")67See Op. Tenn. Att. Gen. March 1, 1939, Tenn. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 4-010. However, if the making of collections is only one of several
functions carried on outside the state it may be taken into consideration in
deciding whether business is done outside the state. Appeal of Spicer & Co.,(Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., April 20, 1932) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
5-802.02.6 8See general discussion concerning business situs of patents in New-
port Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1935) 219 Wis. 293, 310-312, 261
N. W. 884, 891, 100 A. L. R. 1204. See also note 72 below.
69Appeal of Green Spot, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801a.05 ("appellant alleges that it maintains
warehouses in other states and that many deliveries [through independent
brokers] are made therefrom. The mere ownership of property outside the
state, however, does not constitute doing business outside the state;")
Appeal of Great Western Electro Chemical Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal.,
April 24, 1934) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.3 (company's entire
net income was taxed in California even though a few of its sales were made
from warehouses outside the state).
70See Walter H. Frick, (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Feb. 8, 1924) (warehouse
within the state) and A. W. Kimball in re Chequamegon Ice Co., Ruling,
Sept. 8, 1923 (warehouse without the state) in Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service,
pars. 10-809.09 and 10-809.17, respectively. In California, the maintenance
of a warehouse outside the state together with an office constitutes doing
business outside the state. Appeal of Apex Rotarex Manufacturing Co.,(Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 9, 1936) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
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cases which hold that the maintenance of a warehouse or storage
facilities constitutes doing business would appear, perhaps, the
more accurate. The same conflict of authority will probably also
arise with respect to the accounting and other functions mentioned
should the courts be presented with situations in which, instead of
"incidental" accounting, there was involved a regular accounting
office outside the state at which a permanent staff was continuously
employed; in which, instead of a bank account, there was the tax-
payer's principal financial office ;71 in which, instead of collectors,
there was a collection office; and in which, instead of a few re-
search employees, there was a permanent research department and
laboratories outside the state.72
A taxpayer is likewise engaged in business outside the state
if its purchases made there or its management located there give
that outside state jurisdiction to impose the tax, provided, of
course, that economically speaking the income is there earned.
The few court decisions involving the buying function have been
made in situations in which the taxpayer, in conjunction with
making purchases, was engaged in other business activities. Thus
5-802.01. In Laurentide v. Durey, (N.D. N.Y. 1916) 231 Fed. 223 above,
the court in deciding that the taxpayer was doing business in the United
States considered the fact among others that "it hired and paid for storage or
warehouse room and had them [goods] delivered to itself at such rooms
where it stored them." (p. 228). In International Elevator Co. v. Thoresen,
(1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228 N. W. 192, the taxpayer was engaged in buying
and storing grain in North Dakota and selling it elsewhere. The court held
it was doing business in North Dakota. In Porto Rico Mercantile Co. v.
Gallardo, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 526 the taxpayer was engaged
in buying and storing molasses in Porto Rico. At page 529, the court
said, "If it can be said to be probable that the storing of molasses in Porto
Rico increased its value there, it is impossible to determine the amount of
profit" and noted that the statute omitted any allocation factor (which
would be the usual device for measuring such profit). In Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151 Kan. 159, 98 P. (2d) 143 the
court took into consideration, among other things, the presence of a ware-
house outside the state in attributing a portion of income to extra-state
activities. The effect of the California Rule would be to recognize the storage
function only in those cases in which the taxpayer engaged in sufficient addi-
tional activities to make qualification necessary, if a foreign corporation, or
service of process effectual. The Wisconsin rule would seem to be more
accurate for it gives recognition to the economic income from storage,
assuming storage to be an income producing factor.
71See People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, (1921) 195 App. Div. 635,
187 N. Y. S. 311.
72See Newport Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1935) 219 Wis. 293,
261 N. W. 884, 100 A. L. R. 1204, where laboratories and a permanent re-
search staff were apparently under consideration. See Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151 Kan. 159, 98 Pac. (2d) 143, with
respect to recognition accorded banking and accounting services, adver-
tising, window displays, training schools and other activities conducted
from without the state.
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it has been held, that a taxpayer is engaged in business and is
taxable on the income attributable thereto where it concurrently
engages in the making of purchases and the storage of goods ;73
where it makes purchases and shipments and stores goods ;74 and
where it engages in both buying and selling.75  On the other hand,
the making of isolated purchases outside of the state does not
constitute doing business there.76 Whether the continuous making
of purchases outside the state constitutes doing business will prob-
ably be answered in the affirmative in some situations7 7 and in the
negative in others.78 The maintenance of a purchasing office in
a state constitutes doing business.7 9 In a few cases there has been
some discussion of the allocation of buying profit by a separate
accounting.8" The few court decisions involving the management
of a business from without the state have been made in situations
in which there was involved a rather passive power of control
rather than the active and detailed conduct of business. The
management of Oklahoma oil fields by an owner and operator
in Illinois "exerted from his place of business" there does not
constitute doing business outside Oklahoma.8 ' The "formulating
73Porto Rico Mercantile Co. v. Gallardo, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925)
6 Fed. (2d) 526, and International Elevator Co. v. Thoresen, (1929) 58
N. D. 776, 228 N. W. 192.
74Village of Westby v. Bekkedal, (1920) 172 Wis. 114, 178 N. W. 461.75Appeal of Yokohama Ki-Sto Kwaisha, Ltd., (1927) 5 B. T. A.
1248; State ex rel. Monjo v. State Tax Comm'n, (1926) 218 App. Div.
1, 217 N. Y. S. 669; Carlos Ruggles Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth,
"(1927) 261 Mass. 450, 158 N. E. 899.78People ex rel. Gaston & Co. v. Gilchrist, (1925) 214 App. Div. 750,
209 N. Y. S. 900 (Memorandum decision stated in Tenn. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 10-801.03 as holding that the making of casual and isolated
purchases and sales outside the state did not constitute doing business
there.) See with respect to service of process on foreign corporations, 18
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, (1933) 406, sec. 8729 and with re-
spect to qualification statutes Idem. Vol. 17, page 523, sec. 8485.
77If the buyer, as agent, has authority to pass the purchase price
and close the transaction and also operates in such way as to subject his
employer to the jurisdiction of the state in which to make the purchases
there is authority, by way of analogy with sales, that business is being
done. See note 90 below.7
sIf the buyer, as agent, is restricted to the solicitation of offers of
sale, business, by analogy with sales, would not be done. See note 91 below.
As to mail order purchases, see by way of analogy notes 87 and 88 below.
Sales subject to the buyer's confirmation were involved in Montag Bros. v.
State Rev. Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S. E. 563.79Appeal of El Dorado Oil Works, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15,
1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.017. See Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151 Kan. 159, 98 Pac. (2d) 143.80Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, (1930) 283 U. S. 123, 135, 51
Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879, and S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett, (S.D.N.Y.
1931) 51 F. (2d) 353, 355 aff'd 287 U. S. 565, 53 Sup. Ct. 13, 77 L. Ed. 498.
8
'Shaffer v. Carter, (E.D. Okl. 1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221,
64 L. Ed. 445.
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of plans and policies" and the holding of directors' meetings out-
side the state also do not constitute doing extra-state business.-
2
Conversely, the presence of "incidental management,"8' 3 of business
trustees,' or of a partner 5 within the state does not bring a
business, otherwise carried on without the state, within the state.
On the other hand, a company which maintains outside the state
an office from which the business is actively conducted in a de-
tailed and continuous manner will probably be held to be doing
a multi-state business s a The difference between these two types
of situations may be justified upon the jurisdictional considera-
tions already mentioned.
The problem most frequently raised does not concern the
management of a business, the making of its purchases, the
operation of its factory or the performance of any one of the other
business functions already mentioned. It concerns the securing
of sales.-'  Determination of the place at which sales profit
may legally be said to be earned involves both the economic
problem of localizing the income and the legal problem of the
state's power to tax it. A taxpayer is not engaged in business out-
side the state and is not considered to be earning income there by
virtue of mail order sales made to extra-state customers.8 7  Nor
s-2Cottonwood Coal Co. v. Junod, (1935) 73 Mont. 392, 236 Pac. 1080.
In Underwood Typewriter Company v. Chamberlain, (1920) 254 U. S.
113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165, the taxpayer unsuccessfully urged
"that the real producing elements of net income depend on the executive
management [in New York) rather than its plant" in Connecticut. In Pied-
mont and N. Ry. v. Query, (E.D. S.C. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 172 "certain ex-
penses of general management" were incurred outside the state. See also
In re Kansas City Star Company (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 1029.
83United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, (1915) 161 Wis. 211,
219, 153 N. W r. 241, 244 aff'd 249 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed.
1135.
"'State ex rel. Mariner v. Hampel, (1920) 172 Wis. 67, 178 N. W.
244 (land and mines in Michigan were owned by Wisconsin trustees who
"had practically the same powers with respect to the control and manage-
ment" as their predecessor corporation from which the properties had
been conveyed to them.)
s State v. Eberhardt, (1914) 158 Wis. 20, 147 N. W. 1016 (partner-
ship income from a dredging business in Texas held not taxable to resident
partner in Wisconsin).
s~aSee Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151
Kan. 159, 98 Pac. (2d) 143.
8GOnly those sales continuously and regularly made are here under
consideration. The profit from isolated sales is, of course, not subject to
allocation. See note 28 above and cases cited. In People ex rel. Gaston &
Co. v. Gilchrist, (1925) 214 App. Div. 750, 209 N. Y. S. 900, an
allocation was denied where isolated sales and purchases were the only
transactions outside the state.
87Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga. App. 660, 179
S. E. 563, aff'd 182 Ga. 568, 186 S. E. 558. Here the court held that the busi-
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is a taxpayer engaged in business within the state by reason of
correspondence with customers there residing. 8 Although there may
be some inaccuracy from the economic aspect,8 9 the result seems
sound, for a contrary rule would assign sales income a situs for
taxation in a state which, under the usual circumstances, would
not have power to impose the tax. Where sales are solicited
outside the state by salesmen whose authority is limited to the
solicitation of offers of purchase, the same rule obtains 0 and,
although subject to some doubt as to its economic accuracy, seems
sound for the reasons stated. However, it has been held that a
business is done outside the state and a sales income there earned
where sales are consummated by salesmen or agencies outside the
ness of the taxpayer was "carried on entirely within the state" saying: " . . .
that in its several kinds of sales, . . . some to mail order customers out
of the state . . . there is no contention. . . ." In Hump Hairpin Ifg. Co. v.
Emmerson, (1922) 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 305, 66 L. Ed. 622, the
court held all business was done within the state. The case involved a
tax on the privilege of doing business measured by the value of capital
stock represented by property and business within the state. In a dictum
the court stated that an income tax would be valid under similar circum-
stances. Accord: Appeal of K. Hovden Company, (Cal. St. Bd. of Eaual.,
April 24, 1934) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801.01; Appeal of Great
Western Electro Chemical Co. and Appeal of American Engraving &
Color Plate Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Dec. 14, 1931) Cal. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 5-802.03.
88Ruling of Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
10-809.15.
89The economist might have reason to contend that some small por-
tion of the sales profit should be attributed to the state in which the cus-
tomer resides, where the decision to purchase is made, from which the
price is paid and within which the goods are delivered.
9OWith respect to solicitation outside the state: Montag Bros. v. State
Rev. Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S. E. 563; People ex rel.
Lummis v. Graves, (1937) 251 App. Div. 591, 297 N. Y. S. 967; Cerf v.
Lynch, (1932) 237 App. Div. 283, 261 N. Y. S. 231; Appeals of K. Hovden
Co., of Great Western Electro Chemical Co. and of American Engraving
& Color Plate Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Dec. 14, 1931) Cal. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 5-803.03; Appeals of Rockgas Utilities Co., Ltd. and
Imperial Gas Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., May 21, 1924) Cal. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 5-801.02; Op. N. M. Att. Gen. Sept. 6, 1935, N. M.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 1511; Appeal of O'Bryan Brothers, Inc., (Cal.
St. Bd. of Equal., April 7, 1938) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
5-801.03. See also Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, (1922) 258
U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 305, 66 L. Ed. 622. With respect to solicitation
within the state: Curlee Clothing Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, (1937)
180 Okla. 116, 69 P. (2d) 834; Ruling of Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, Wis.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-809.15. See People ex rel. Stafford v.
Travis, (1921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109, 15 A. L. R. 1319. In
Curlee Clothing Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, (1937) 180 Okla. 116,
68 Pac. (2d) 834, the court said: "Since the sovereign power of the
state did not extend to the business from which the income arose . . .
the commission was without jurisdiction to levy the tax ... " For dis-
cussion of above cases see note 157 below:
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state with authority to close them there.91 It has also been held,
under a different rule, that such part of a company's sales busi-
ness as involved the shipment of goods from origins without the
state to destinations without the state constitutes extra-state busi-
ness." This latter rule is subject to some doubt both with respect
to its theory " and present authority.9
'"In People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, (1921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132
N. E. 109, 15 A. L. R. 1319, some of the orders taken by the field repre-
sentatives outside the state "there became consummated agreements of pur-
chase and sale between relator and such customers" (p. 114). The tax-
payer also "employed travelling salesmen in different places in Europe,
South America, and Australia, some of whom maintained offices where
the name of G. A. Stafford & Co., under which the relator did business,
may have been displayed." (p. 113). The court held income from such
sales earned outside New York. Accord: People ex rel. Monjo v. State
Tax Comm'n, (1926) 218 App. Div. 1, 217 N. Y. S. 669. Note, however,
special New York statute stated in note 95 below. See Appeal of Howard
Auto Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., May 15, 1931) Cal. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 5-802.06. For cases which involve the rule which assigns
sales a situs in the state in which the last act necessary to pass title oc-
curred, see note 150 below and text. For cases involving the confirmation
of sales see notes 159 and 160 below and text.
92United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, (1915) 161 Wis.
211, 153 N. W. 241, aff'd 249 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135;
Appeal of Great Western Electro Chemical Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal.,
April 24, 1934) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.03; Appeal of
Charles Harley Co., (Dec. 14, 1931) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.03.
A third rule under the particular wording of the Missouri statute may
be that the presence of salesmen outside the state is alone sufficient to make
sales those "which are transactions partly within this state and partly
without this state" and permit allocation. Artophone Corp. v. Coale, (1939)
345 Mo. 344, 133 S. W. (2d) 343. For statute see note 145 below.( 31t assigns sales a taxable situs in a state which might not have
jurisdiction to tax. Additional questions are raised with respect to the
construction of the Wisconsin statute, for the United States Glue Co.
had its principal sales office in Wisconsin and branch sales offices in many
of the larger cities of the United States. If, in fact, sales were consum-
mated through the home office they would not under the rule be Wisconsin
sales if shipment took place entirely outside the state; and if, in fact, the
sales were consummated at branches outside the state they would not
under the rule be extra-state sales if the goods originated in Wisconsin.
Compare Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis. 516,
292 N. W. 897.04Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (E.D. Wis. 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 385, aff'd (C.C.A. 7th Cir.) 48 F. (2d) 801, held that sales of the
taxpayer's Wisconsin branch of goods shipped from the Michigan factory
to Michigan customers were Wisconsin sales. The Wisconsin court in
Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis. 516, 292 N. W.
897, held the taxpayer's entire income taxable in Wisconsin and that
no business was done outside the state. In so doing it emphasized the
fact that sales were conspmmated in the Wisconsin office and that sales-
men outside the state were limited in their authority to the solicitation and
formulation of "proposals" for final action at the home office. Compare
however, California Packing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah
367, 93 P. (2d) 463. In Carlos Ruggles Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth,
(1927) 261 Mass. 450, 158 N. E. 899, an allocation was permitted where
goods were both purchased and sold without the state. Apparently, in the
United States Glue Co., (1917) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed.
1135, no allocation was allowed in respect to this type of sale.
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Where the taxpayer maintains branch sales offices outside the
state and operates them under such circumstances as would sub-
ject it, if a foreign corporation, to the jurisdiction of the extra-
state courts or to the duty of qualification, no conflict of authority
exists. The decisions are that the taxpayer is engaged in a multi-
state businessP 5 Where, however, some doubt on the facts exists
95An allocation by apportionment fraction has been allowed where the
taxpayer had sales branches outside the state. Decisions by tribunals of
state of branch office: Ford Motor Co. v. State, (1935) 65 N. D. 316,
258 N. W. 596 (branch sales offices in North Dakota); Ruling of Wis-
consin Tax Comm'n, note 20 above (taxpayer with principal office in
Chicago and branch office in Milwaukee). Decisions by tribunals of state
of factory or home office: United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,
(1917) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135; Underwood Type-
writer Company v. Chamberlain, (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65
L. Ed. 165; Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, (1930) 283 U. S.
123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879; S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett,
(S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 353, aff'd 287 U. S. 565, 53 Sup. Ct. 13,
77 L. Ed. 498; Appeal of Spicer & Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., April 20,
1932) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.02. An allocation by separate
accounting has been allowed in the same situation. Decisions by tribunals
of state of branch office: Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm'n, (1929) 197 Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85; Fisher v. Standard Oil
Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 744; Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 708; see People ex rel. Studebaker
Corp. of America v. Gilchrist, (1926) 244 N. Y. 114, 155 N. E. 68, Buick
Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (E.D. Wis. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 385, and
Billwillers Estate v. Comm'r, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 286.
Decisions by tribunals of home office: See State v. Weil, (1936) 232 Ala.
578, 168 So. 679, aff'd on rehear. 237 Ala. 293, 186 So. 467 and State ex rel.
M\tonjo v. State Tax Comm'n, (1926) 218 App. Div. 1, 217 N. Y. S. 669.
The bills-and-accounts-receivable-for-personal-property-sold-from-merchan-
dise-manufactured-within-the-state-or-owned-and-located-within-the-state fac-
tor of the New York fractional formula (note 108 below) has been con-
strued to include sales from New York branches: Bass, Ratcliff and Gret-
ton v. State Tax Comm'n, (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82, 69 L. Ed.
282; Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (S.D. N.Y. 1921)
274 Fed. 975, aff'd (1924) 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279.
Apparently the only decisions which have refused an allocation in those
instances in which the taxpayer was qualified to do business outside the
state are Interstate Bond Co. v. State Rev. Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga. App.
744, 179 S. E. 559, and Appeal of Combined Locks Paper Co., (Wis. Tax
Comm'n, Feb. 1, 1939) Wis. C. C. H. and P. H. Tax Services, pars. 14-562
and 13,348. The former decision was with respect to a domestic corpora-
tion engaged in the business of purchasing and selling tax liens, making
advances and collecting interest and "service" charges thereon. Offices
were maintained in five outside states, in four of which it had qualified
to do business. The company's principal office was at Atlanta. The Georgia
court held the company there taxable upon its entire net income. Possibly
the result may be justified on the theory that the interest and capital gains
were from intangibles which had a business situs within the state. The
latter decision involved a paper company with a branch office in Illinois
and there qualified to do business. One sales employee was occasionally
in Illinois. The office was used frequently by one of the company's execu-
tive officers. The entire income of the company was taxed in Wisconsin.
It would seem that no substantial part of the company's net income could
be said to be earned in Illinois. De Minimis non curat lex. See Appeal
of Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Aug. 21,
1939) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, pars. 10,802.01 and 14-627.
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with respect to whether or not a business office is actually main-
tained outside the state, the results are not so clear." Whether
the making of brokerage sales outside the state or sales on such
public exchanges as those for stock and grain outside the state
constitute doing business are questions also subject to jurisdic-
tional considerations. The activities of brokers outside the state
probably would neither subject the taxpayer, if a foreign corpo-
ration, to the service of process nor make qualification necessary.
If so, a situs for taxation of the income from brokerage sales
would not be assigned to the state of the location of the brokers
and the taxpayer would not be considered to be doing business
there.'17 To the extent that exchange sales are made through
-In Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis. 516, 292
N. W. 897, the standard agency contract provided that the agent should
maintain at his expense a suitably equipped sales and service office with
the company's name appearing on the entrance, in the telephone book and
other directories. It did not appear whether these agreements were com-
plied with. The court held that no business was being done outside the
state. In People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, (1921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E.
109, 15 A. L. R. 1319, the court noted among other facts that the company's
name appeared on the doors of sales offices. If a stock of goods is main-
tained at the branch office from which sales are made a business is, of
course, being done. Ruling (Wis. Tax Comm'n, May 26, 1925) C. C. H.
Wis. Tax Service, par. 10-809.06; Appeal of Apex Rotarex Manufacturing
Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 9, 1936) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
5-802.01. However, the maintenance of a mailing headquarters for sales-
men, listing in the telephone directory, the placing of a name on an office
door and the keeping of samples for the inspection of prospective customers
does not necessarily constitute doing business within the state. Ruling
Wis. Tax Comm'n Ibid. Compare ruling (Wis. Tax Comm'n, March 10,
1924) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-809.14. The maintenance of an
office for the forwarding of mail and telegrams, for the direction of cus-
tomers, and for occasional calls by salesmen does not constitute doing
business. People ex rel. Brighton Mills v. Knapp, (1920) 192 App. Div.
740, 183 N. Y. S. 480. Where, in addition to samples on display, a stock
of goods is maintained for sale, business is done. Gorham Manufacturing
Co. v. Travis, (S.D. N.Y. 1921) 274 F. 975, aff'd (1924) 266 U. S. 265,
45 Sup. Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279. In Baseball Publishing Co. v. Commission,
(1933) 1 Mass. B. T. A. 717 the court held that a billboard advertising
company was doing business in New York. It occupied a New York office
jointly with an affiliated company; paid no rent; salesmen and officers
visited the New York office; the treasurer was permanently employed in
New York; a bank account was kept in New York; and its name was in the
telephone directory. No allocation however was allowed under the Massa-
chusetts statute. See note 137 below and text. In Appeal of Great Western
Electro Chemical Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Dec. 14, 1931) Cal. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 5-802.03, the board held that the entire income was
earned in California notwithstanding sales made from a Washington office.
The nature of the Washington office was not stated. As to a statutory office
see Appeal of California Despatch Line, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Mar. 10,
1938) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801a.03.
0TAppeal of K. Hovden Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., April 24, 1934)
Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801.01 (company with brokers on com-
mission basis outside the state with authority there to consummate the
sales, to make deliveries from warehouses outside state and to make collec-
tions held to be doing its entire business in California) ; Appeal of Green
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brokers they should be similarly treated 5  With respect to ware-
house and consignment sales there is, in addition to the economic
and jurisdictional factors, another involving the storage function.
To date the decisions have localized warehouse sales upon prin-
ciples not primarily concerned with the place of storage of the
goods sold. 99 They have been assigned a situs where made, either
at the home office' 09 or at the field office.' 0' By analogy a taxpayer
with merchandise in the possession of consignees outside the state
would not be considered to be doing business there merely by reason
of such storage of goods but by reason of other considerations
relating to jurisdiction and the manner in which the sales are
m ade.1 -
2
Spot, Inc., (Cal. St. Ed. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 5-801a.05 (same holding and same facts except that brokers
also paid warehousing costs) ; Appeal of Great Western Electro Chemical
Co., (Cal. St. Ed. of Equal., Dec. 14, 1931) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 5-803.03. See also Appeal of Combined Locks Paper Co., note 95
above. If the brokers should be so closely controlled as to lose their
status as independent contractors the result might be different or dependent
on other considerations.
98In Appeal of Henry Investment Co., (Cal. St. Ed. of Equal., Mar.
15, 1933) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.08, it was held that a Cali-
fornia firm trading on margin through its brokers on the New York
stock exchange was not doing business in New York. Possibly under
other and different circumstances the relationship between the taxpayer
and its representative on the exchange might be such that the seller would
be considered doing business outside the state. See International Elevator
Co. v. Thoresen, (1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228 N. W. 192, where it was
stipulated that sales on the Minneapolis grain exchanges were Minnesota
sales. As to independent contractors, see Appeal of Filtrol Co. of Cali-
fornia, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 5-801a.02.
99It might be argued that a warehouse sale is the result of three factors,
namely, the activities of the home office, the activities of the field representa-
tive, whether employee or broker, and quick dlivery effected by the
proximate location of the warehouse. The decisions to date have considered
the first two factors only (as well as the question of jurisdiction). Appar-
ently, warehouse sales will be considered without reference to the place
from which delivery is made. Storage will probably be considered a
separate function. See notes 69, 70 and text.
'
0OAppeals of K. Hovden Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., April 24, 1934)
Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801.01; Green Spot, Inc., (Cal. St. Bd. of
Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-801a.05; and
Great Western Electro Chemical Co., (Cal. St. Ed. of Equal., Dec. 14, 1931)
Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.03. But see Cal. Packing Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93 P. (2d) 463.
l0'Appeal of Apex Rotarex Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 9, 1936)
Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.01; Ruling (Wisconsin Tax Comm'n,
May 26, 1925), Gorham Manufacturing Company v. Travis, (S.D. N.Y.
1921) 274 F. 975, aff'd (1924) 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed.
279, and other authorities cited in note 96 above where the presence of the
goods at the branch was stressed as an additional factor.
1021n Trane Company v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis.
516, 292 N. W. 897, the court held that no extra-state business was done,
notwithstanding the fact that "consigned stocks were maintained" outside
ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS INCOME
II. ALLOCATION OF INCOME
Only that income is subject to allocation which is from an
integral, multi-state business. This allocation may be made by
a statutory apportionment fraction, by an equitable apportionment
or by a separate accounting. Under the first method the intra-
state portion of the income from a multi-state business is deter-
mined by applying a statutory fraction to the entire income. By
a separate accounting the same determination is made but by an
application and use of accounting records, principles and practices.
In an equitable apportionment an administrative selection and
application of apportionment fractions is made. The various
methods of allocation may be separately considered.
A. Allocation by Statutory Fraction.-The principal constitu-
tional limitations upon statutory apportionment fractions are with
respect to their structure and the results of their application. 0 3
Structural deficiency may invalidate the formula; inequity in re-
sults, the particular application.
These fractions generally contain in the numerator some in-
come producing factor which may be assigned a situs within the
state, such as property, payroll or sales. The dominator includes
similar factors everywhere. The factor or factors in the denomi-
nator must correspond to those in the numerator.10 4 The legisla-
the state. The presence of goods in the hands of consignees outside the
state generally does not make it necessary for a foreign corporation to
qualify to do business. See 17 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, (1933)
520, sec. 8484 and the few exceptions there noted.
103A third constitutional question concerning the commerce clause in-
volves a question pertinent to income taxation in general rather than one
with respect to allocation. At the present time it does not appear that a
state income tax will be held to constitute a direct and substantial burden
on interstate commerce even in instances in which the entire business of the
taxpayer is interstate. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., (1940) 309 U. S. 33, 47, 60 Sup. Ct. 388, 392, 84 L. Ed. 565, 570
(dictum: "A tax may be levied on net inome wholly derived from inter-
state commerce;") Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.,
(1940) 61 Sup. Ct. 253; Appeal of Stebbins Engineering and Mfg. Co.,
(Wis. Tax Comm'n, Nov. 3, 1938) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-546;
and United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, (1917) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup.
Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135 (where the court stated that an income tax was
only an indirect burden on interstate commerce). Contra: Matson Naviga-
tion Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, (1935) 3 Cal. (2d) 1, 43 P. (2d) 805,
aff'd 297 U. S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 553, 80 L. Ed. 791 (dictum on page 446,
"A foreign corporation whose sole business in California is interstate and
foreign commerce cannot be subjected to the tax in question." The case is
possibly explainable as involving a franchise tax measured by net income
and not a direct income tax) ; Colgate v. Harvey, (1935) 296 U. S. 404,
56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299 (Justice Stone dissenting at page 448,
"... a state tax on net income derived from interstate commerce has never
been regarded as a burden on commerce or as an infringement of the commerce
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ture is not restricted in its selection to any particular factor or
factors."' Its range of choice, however, has limits. The factors
selected must reflect business functions essential to the profitable
conduct of the enterprise. The leading case is People ex rel.
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp.100 The New York statute
in question made provision for the apportionment of business in-
come, including dividends and interest,'"° by a formula which
clause." Case overruled in Madden v. Kentucky, (1940) 309 U. S. 83, 60
Sup. Ct. 406, 84 L. Ed. 590). See also Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, (1923) 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L. Ed. 916
(business excise tax measured by net income) and compare Ficklen v.
Shelby County, (1891) 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810, 36 L. Ed. 601 (license
tax on commissions of brokers engaged exclusively in interstate commerce).
It is well established that where a company is doing both an intra-state
and inter-state business its net income from interstate commerce is taxable.
United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, (1917) 247 U. S. 321, 38
Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
(1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165; Matson Navigation
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, (1935) 3 Cal. (2d) 1, 43 P. (2d) 805,
aff'd 297 U. S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 553, 80 L. Ed. 791. Compare Koppers Co.
v. City of Milwaukee, (1926) 191 Wis. 397, 211 N. W. 147 with appeal
of Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Nov.
5, 1938) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-546, with respect to whether
or not income from the sale of goods in connection with construction con-
tracts is taxable.104People ex rel. Union Bag and Paper Corporation v. Knapp, (1925)
212 App. Div. 221, 207 N. Y. S. 673 (statute in the numerator included all
"tangible personal property" and in the denominator all "personal property."
The court construed the latter phrase as not including intangible personal
property) ; People ex rel. Societe v. Knapp, (1920) 191 App. Div. 701, 182
N. Y. S. 448 (the same accounts receivable may not twice be included in
the numerator of a fraction).
losSixteen different fractions are listed as having been adopted in
various states at page 5 of the 1939 Report of the Committee of the National
Tax Association on Allocation of Income. They are as follows:
Number of States
"Income Factors Using These Factors
Property, Payroll, Sales .......................................................... 10
Property, Manufacturing Costs, Sales ................................... 7
Property, Sales .............................................................................. 8
Sales ................................................................................................... 8
Property, Manufacturing Costs ............................................... 1
Property, Costs of Sales, Sales ...................................................... 1
Property, Payroll ......................................................................... 2
Property, Shares of other Corporations, Accounts Receivable 1
Property, Payroll, Sales, Purchases ........................................ 1
Property ........................................................................................ . 1
M anufacturing Costs ........................................................................ 1
M arketing Costs ............................................................................ 1
Property, Payroll, Sales, Manufacturing Costs .................... 1
Cost of Sales ..................................................................................... 1
Property, Payroll, Purchases ........................................................ 1
Loans, W ages, Interest .................................................................... 1"
106(1920) 230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202.
1OThe statute selected as a base the income upon which the taxpayer
paid a tax to the United States. This would apparently include dividend
and interest income.
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failed to take into consideration the value of the interest producing
bonds and ninety per cent of the value of the dividend paying
stocks.108 The court held the formula unconstitutional as applied
to the types of income involved, but after reconstruction approved
the formula as revised. 0 9 The effect of this case would be, in
one aspect to" exclude from apportionable income earnings of a
type which bear no reasonable relationship to any of the factors
in the fraction, and in another, to require the inclusion in the
fraction of at least one factor which bears some reasonable rela-
tionship to the income allocated.110 A compound or multiple frac-
tion may include factors, one or more, yet less than all, of which
are not related to the income being apportioned."" The reasoning
of the Alpha Portland Cement Case would require exclusion of
the unrelated factor or factors." 2 The converse of this is not true,
however. An allocation fraction is not required to include as
'
0
sThe formula was as follows:
Real and Tangible Personal Property in N. Y. + Bills and Accounts
Receivable in N. Y. + 10 per cent of Stock in N. Y.
Real and Tangible Personal Property Everywhere + Bills and Accounts
Receivable Everywhere + 10 per cent of Stock Everywhere
The statute included provisions specifying the situs of bills and accounts
receivable and stock.
'
0 9 The court indicated that the entire amount of interest income should
be omitted from the basic income to be allocated and that the entire value
of stock should be included in the formula.
"
0OThere are many instances in which this rule might find application.
For example, apportioning business income by a fraction including only
stock, bonds or other property not used in business; or apportioning busi-
ness income by a fraction including only sales not made in the business; or
apportioning business income by a fraction including only payroll of
persons not employed in the business; or apportioning dividend income
solely on a tangible property, sales or payroll basis; or apportioning interest
income on similar bases solely. These principles may here have some
application in those cases in which it is uncertain whether the court con-
sidered the selling and distribution activities of oil companies to be an
integral business separate from production and refining. If the "sales"
profit is to be apportioned among the sates in which the sales offices are
located then only assets used in the sales end of the business may be used
in the formula. If, on the other hand, the entire income is being allocated,
then all assets should be included. Cf. Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 744 with Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 708.
"'For example a formula may include tangible property and bond
factors. The taxpayer earns a business income, but no interest although
it owns bonds. The effect of the application of the formula would be to
give bonds a fifty per cent weight in apportioning business income. Or
take, for example, a formula containing property and sales factors. The
taxpayer is engaged in renting and selling properties. He makes no profit
on his sales. The effect of the application of the formula would be to give
unrelated sales a fifty per cent weight in allocating income from the rental
business.
"-It would seem as easy an operation to omit a factor as add one.
See statutory provisions cited in notes 251 and 252 below and text.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
many functional factors as there are corresponding functions in
the business. Such a rule would present a practically impossible
administrative task. It has been held that the income of a manu-
facturing concern may be apportioned on the basis of a property
factor alone 13 notwithstanding the fact that numerous other busi-
ness functions such as selling and management1 4 are~also involved
in the earning of the final net income. The same decision has
been made with respect to a mercantile concern. 1 5 A single
gross receipts factor has also been approved as applied to manu-
facturing,llla automobile assembling,"" shipping" 7 and newspaper
businesses. 8 Under these cases an apportionment formula would
be prima facie valid vith respect to the allocation of income if
there is present therein any one factor reflecting a material func-
tion of the business. Although a single factor fraction may be
valid, multiple fractions frequently reach a more accurate result
and are commonly used." 9 A two-way formula of property and
"13Decisions of the courts of the state of the location of the factory:
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup.
Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165 ("fair cash value of the real and the tangible personal
property;") State ex rel. Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., (1933) 204
N. C. 365, 168 S. E. 397, 90 A. L. R. 476 ("fair cash value of its real
estate and tangible personal property;") Baldwin Tool Works v. Blue,
(N.D. W.Va. 1916) 240 Fed. 202 ("assessed value . .. of its assets and
property;") United States Rubber Products v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
(1939) 189 S. C. 386, 1 S. E. (2d) 153; see National Leather Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, (1928) 277 U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 534, 72 L. Ed. 935 (tax on
corporate excess) ; see Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, (1897)
165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683 (property tax on going con-
cern value). Decision of the courts of the state of the place of sales: Ford
Motor Co. v. State, (1935) 65 N. D. 316, 258 N. W. 596 ("property;")
and see Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d)
744 and Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 29 F.
(2d) 708.
liASee cases in preceding note. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165, the
state court (94 Conn. 47, 108 Atl. 154) said: "The plaintiff's theory is
that the real producing elements of net income depend on the executive
management of the corporation, rather than its plant. But . .. it is not
unjust to allocate its net income . . . with reference to the value of its
tangible property in this and other jurisdictions."
11Carlos Ruggles Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, (1927) 261 Mass.
450, 158 N. E. 899 (decision of the court of the state of the main office).
lllaBurkhart Manufacturing Co. v. Coale, (1940) 345 Mo. 1131, 139
S. W. (2d) 502.
"
0 See Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, (1939) 308 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct.
273, 84 L. Ed. 304.
"'Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization, (1935) 3
Cal. (2d) 1, 43 P. (2d) 805.
':'In re Kansas City Star Co., (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 1029. (The
fraction applied was Missouri circulation over circulation everywhere. Ad-
vertising receipts were not included.)
19 See note 105 above. Even a multiple fraction may fail to reflect
each of all the various functions in the business such as accounting, buying,
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sales has received judicial approval.120  So also have three-way
formulas of property, sales and manufacturing costs, 2 1 and sales,
property and payroll.12 2  Multiple formulas of other types have
also been approved.
12 3
The legislature may not create irrational fractions. Neither
may the tax authority apply one which results in obvious inequity.
The taxpayer's burden of proof, however, is not easily sustained.
The presumption is that a formula of proper structure is prima
facie correct. 2 4 In Hans Rees' Sons v. State of North Carolina, 25
the taxpayer showed that only 17 to 21.7 per cent of its income
for the years in question was actually earned in North Carolina
whereas the statute apportioned from 66 to 85 per cent of it to
that state. The tax as applied was held unconstitutional. On the
other hand, proof of a three or four per cent error in the appor-
tionment of a taxpayer's income does not demonstrate inequity. 2
financing, research, sales, plant, storing, credits, collections, transporting and
extracting.
120See United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, (1917) 247
U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135; United States Rubber Products
v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, (1939) 189 S. C. 386, 1 S. E. (2d) 153.
12Palmolive Co. v. Conway, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 83;
Northern States Power Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (Wis. Tax Comm'n,
June 3, 1939) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-613.
1"'Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kolodner, (1936) 320 Pa. St. 421,
184 At. 37 (apparently decision of state of place of factory) and Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania v. Columbia Gas and Electric Corp., (1939) 336 Pa.
St. 209, 8 A. (2d) 404 (capital stock tax) ; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Commonwealth, (1923) 244 Mass. 530, 139 N. E. 158, 248 Mass. 156, 142
N. E. 762, reversed on other grounds 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69
L. Ed. 916, 44 A. L. R. 1219; California Packing Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93 P. (2d) 463; Appeal of El Dorado Oil
Works, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 5-803.017. See Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth,
(1922) 242 Mass. 47, 136 N. E. 375, 27 A. L. R. 1131.
123International Elevator Co. v. Thoresen, (1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228
N. W. 192, approved the following:
Average of
tangible property in state a
tangible property everywhere and( payroll in state + cost of goods sold in state + sales in state
payroll everywhere + cost of goods sold everywhere + sales everywhere
Union Pacific Railway v. State Tax Comm'n, (1937) 145 Kan. 715, 68 P.(2d) 1, approved a three way formula of tangible property, gross revenue,
and expense. See also New York formula stated in note 108 above, and
considered in cases cited in notes 42, 95 and 106 above.
124Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (S.D. N.Y. 1921)
274 Fed. 975. At page 979 Judge Learned Hand said, "Prima facie it
remains a sound rule . . . ." In Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kolodner,
(1936) 320 Pa. St. 421, 184 AtI. 37, the court said, "The ... formula stands
as the prima facie method . . . "
125(1930) 283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879.
12 See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d)
353, aff'd 287 U. S. 565, 53 Sup. Ct. 13, 77 L. Ed. 498, where the taxpayer
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The place at which inaccuracy becomes so gross as to constitute
inequity has not as yet been precisely delineated by decision.12
Generally, however, the taxpayer has failed to sustain the burden
of proof and the formula has been upheld. 28 In one unusual case
the court, in voiding an allocation fraction, took judicial notice
of facts tending to show that the results of its application would
be unfair.129 It has been held that the taxpayer must not only
prove "unfairness," but its exact amount.130 With respect to this
second constitutional limitation, economic and accounting proofs
are of decisive importance. Prerequisite to the demonstration of
error is proof of the actual amount of income earned within the
state. This means, in effect, that the taxpayer must have avail-
able the data for a separate accounting.' 3' Possibly this second
limitation upon statutory apportionment may, not altogether too
claimed that its income taxable in New York for the two years in question
was only 6.30 and 6.31 per cent of its total income. The apportionment
formula allocated 9.72 per cent and 8.97 per cent of total income to the
taxing state. The principal weakness of the taxpayer's case was lack of
reliable accounting data. At page 355 the court said: "It may possibly be
that the plaintiff's figures are a somewhat closer approximation than the
commission's but that would not warrant our holding the tax illegal if the
commissioner's method was a reasonable one."
1
27 In this situation the phrase, "Damnum absque injuria," might seem
more apt than, "A little wrong is no injustice."
128Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, (1920) 254 U. S. 113,
41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165; State ex rel. Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg.
Co., (1933) 204 N. C. 365, 168 S. E. 397, 90 A. L. R. 476; Bass, Ratcliff
& Gretton v. State Tax Comm'n, (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82,
69 L. Ed. 282; Norfolk and Western R. Co. v. State of N. C. ex rel. Max-
well, (1935) 297 U. S. 682, 56 Sup. Ct. 625, 80 L. Ed. 977. Decisions, in
accord, of both the state and lower federal courts may be found in other
footnotes.
129 Vallace v. Hines, (1920) 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435, 64 L. Ed. 782(railway mileage ratio invalidated, the court judicially noting that North
Dakota was "a state of plains, very different from other states" and that
consequently terminal facilities would be preponderantly out of the state
without regard to mileage. The tax was one on corporate excess).
130See People ex rel. Charles Kohlman & Sons v. Law, (1925) 239
N. Y. 346, 146 N. E. 622. In this case the question arose as to the situs of
the accounts-receivable-from-orders-accepted-in-the-state factor, note 108
above, of the New York apportionment formula. The taxpayer failed to
indicate in its return or show the commission at the hearing how many
sales were accepted outside the state. The tax commission assessed the tax
on the assumption that all sales were accepted in New York. In affirming
the commission's order and reversing the appellate division Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the court said: "In the absence of evidence fixing
with reasonable certainty the quantum of error, the board should not be
required to roam about in search of information impeaching its own action.
The assessment stands as ordered till the taxpayer has shown to what extent
it is excessive." In Hans Rees' Sons v. State of North Carolina, (1930)
283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879, the taxpayer proved the
exact quantum of error.
131The statutory right to a separate accounting is discussed below.
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inaccurately, be described as the taxpayer's constitutional "right"
to a separate accounting. Whether the state has a "right"
analogous to that of the taxpayer has not yet been directly de-
cided. 3" However, it %would seem just as inaccurate to impose
a tax for less than is due as to impose one for more.133 Possibly
the burden of proof would make any so-called "right" on the
part of the state an illusory one.13
4
More specific than questions of constitutional limitation are
those with respect to the localization and valuation of apportion-
ment factors. The application of sales, property and payroll
factors raises problems of both fact and statutory construction.
1. The Sales Ratio.-The lack of uniformity which obtains
with respect to the selection of statutory allocation factors by
the various state legislatures obtains also with respect to their
wording and interpretation. The sales factor is no exception. The
statutes or regulations of many states assign sales a situs in the
state in which the business activity chiefly conducing to such
sales may be said to be localized. Thus, sales are often con-
sidered to have a situs within the state if "made through or by
offices, agencies or branches" located within the state.3 5  An-
other comman statutory provision of similar purport is that which
localizes receipts from sales at "the office, agency, or place of
business . . . at or from which the transactions giving rise to such
receipts are chiefly handled and attended to with respect to nego-
'
32See note 219 below and text.
133Whether, as a matter of popular psychology, it would be thoughtjust as unfair is, perhaps, another question.
13 4Generally, the taxpayer's books are the principal, if not the only,
source of information. See Ford Motor Co. v. State, (1935) 65 N. D. 316,
258 N. W. 596.
'
35Arizona, sec. 3182x, 3 Revised Code Supp. 1934; North Carolina,
Code 1935, sec. 7880 (128) II, 2, (b), as reenacted in 1939 Laws, ch. 158,
art. IV, Schedule D; South Dakota, Code 1939, sec. 57.2707(3) ; Wisconsin,
Statutes 1939, sec. 71.02, (3) (d) 3; Oregon, Art. 307-2 of 1940 Regula-
tions, par. 14-536 of Or. C. C. H. Tax Service, (sales from stock not
taxpayer's). Minnesota, Mason's 1940 Supp., sec. 2394-25 (A) (1) (a)
includes as Minnesota sales those "made through, from or by offices,
agencies, branches or stores" within this state as well as those "made within
this state." Iowa in Art. 11 (d) (Iowa, C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 1461-4)
of the 1937 Regulations to the personal income tax law adopts the language
of the first quoted provision of the Minnesota statute. The 1935 New York
Unincorporated Business Tax Act in McKinley's Consolidated Laws of
New York, Book 59, Art. 16-A, sec. 386 (g), provides in part for the inclu-
sion of sales "by or through an agency located within the state." Louisiana
in art. 216 of its Regulations (Louisiana C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 14-716)
provides, in part, for the inclusion of sales "by or through any branch,
agency, office or other place of business within the state."
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tiation and execution."'136 Other states localize all sales of doubt-
ful situs within the state by assigning to the taxing jurisdiction
all sales "except those negotiated or effected in behalf of the
corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, connected
with or sent out from premises for the transaction of business"
owned or rented (maintained) by the corporation outside the
state.U7 A few states, in addition to localizing sales at the place
of the agency, office, branch or other center of business activity
producing such sales, provide for localization at the place of the
residence of the agent. Thus, sales have been given a local situs
if "principally secured, negotiated or effected by employees, agents,
offices, or branches of the taxpayer's business resident or located"
within the state. 3 It may be observed that the statutory provi-
sions of this majority of states 3 9 are essentially similar in that they
localize sales at an office or agency from which emanate the activities
producing the sales. This localization may be described as that
of office situs.
To be compared with this majority rule are the various
minority rules in other states. One rule assigns sales a situs
at the place at which the goods sold are delivered. 40  Another
'
36Kentucky, Statutes, (Carroll 1936) sec. 4281b-32 (1) (c) (D);
North Dakota Compiled Laws, 1925 Supplement, sec. 2346a6, 2, (c) (2).
The New York Unincorporated Business Tax Act, provides in addition to
the part quoted in note 135 above that "all sales negotiated or consummated
by salesmen 'attached to or sent from offices, or other agencies situated
within the state' shall constitute local sales."
137Massachusetts, General Laws 1932, ch. 63, sec. 38, 6; Pennsylvania,
Purdon's Statutes Supp., Tit. 72, sec. 3420b, "Net Income" 2, (c), (3);
Utah, Revised Statutes 1933, 80-13-21(6) (e) (1st). The Utah supreme
court in California Packing Corporation v. State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97
Utah 367, 93 P. (2d) 463, redrafted the statute so as to include as local
sales those "sales (within the state), except those negotiated or effected
in behalf of the corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, con-
nected with or sent out from premises (within the state) for the transaction
of business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state. . .. 1p
Utah may now be considered to have a statute similar to those in other
states assigning a local situs to sales made "within the state." For facts
of this case see note 163 below. Apparently the court was apprehensive
of manipulation by the taxpayer.
'
3 8South Carolina, Code 1932, sec. 2451 (2); United States Income
Tax Reg. 101, art. 119-12, case 2-A, p. 344, but compare note 143 post.
See Maryland, Reg. No. 3 set forth in pars. 10-807, 14-453 of Md. C. C. H.
Tax Service.
13 9The statutes of 18 states are cited in the footnotes above.
140Colorado, Laws 1937, ch. 175, sec. 17 includes "sales delivered within
this state excluding deliveries for transportation out of the state"-see art.
17 of 1937 Regulations in Col. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-806; Iowa,
Code 1939, sec. 6943.065, 1, b provides, "sales of the corporation within the
state shall be taken to be gross sales from goods sold and delivered within
the state, excluding deliveries for transportation out of the state." See also
Art. 248 Regulations No. 5 Miss. 1937 and 1940 pocket Supp. to Williams
Tennessee Code, sec. 1316 (1) (c).
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assigns sales a situs within the state from which shipment is
made.141 A considerable number of other statutes refer generally
to "sales within the state" without further specification.' These
last statutes establish what may be fairly described as a "con-
structional" situs for the statutory phrase has no definite meaning
without the aid of judicial interpretation.143  Some other juris-
dictions assign sales a situs in the state in which the last act
necessary to pass title occurred. 44  This suggests the conflict of
laws rule and will be so described hereafter.
It may be observed that under each of these five 45 rules the
14'New Mexico, Laws 1933, ch. 85, sec. 31 (see sec. 21) and Virginia,
Tax Code sec. 54 in Appendix to Virginia, Code 1936, "'gross receipts in
this state' . . . shall include . . .all receipts from sales, wherever made, of
products, goods, wares, and merchandise manufactured, or which originated
in this state. . . ." Oregon, 1938 Regulations, Art. 186 (a) C. C. H. Or.
Tax Service page 1587-41 with respect to sales from stock of goods of
taxpayer provides: "The place of sales made . . . is the location of the
stock from which the goods are shipped, regardless of the destination .. .
or the place where the contract of sales was consummated." See Vermont,
Public Laws 1933, ch. 40, sec. 894.
142Arkansas, Regulations 7 (1927) art. 362; California, Reg. to Per-
sonal Income Tax Act of 1935, art. 7 (f)-4 and see Act 8494a, sec. 13 of
California, Codes Supp. (Deering 1939) providing for allocation "on the
basis of sales . . .;" and District of Columbia, art. 3 (b) (1) of Reg.
(Par. 10-802 C.C.H. Tax Service). Minnesota, Mason's 1940 Supp. sec.
2594-25 (A) (1) (a) includes "sales made within the state" as well as
sales having an "office situs" therein. See Kansas, Laws 1937, ch. 370,
sec. 3 amending sec. 79-3218 of Gen. Statutes of 1935 and West Virginia,
Laws 1939, sec. 25 (11) with art. 25-60 of Regulations thereunder ("busi-
ness done within the state"-W.Va. C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 14-637). The
Utah statute in effect now contains the phrase "sales (within the state)."
California Packing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah 367,
93 P. (2d) 463.
'I 5 See note 156 below.
144 Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, (1929) 279 U. S. 306, 49 Sup. Ct. 304, 73 L. Ed. 704 (holding
sales profit taxable in Philippines where the "final acts . . . making effective
the sales" occurred) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. East Coast Oil
Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 322. ("The title passed to the
buyer in Mexico. When title passed, the profit was earned in Mexico.
Collection of the price in the United States was incidental, and did not earn
the profit.") Briskey Co. v. Commissioner, (1934) 29 B. T. A. 987 (sales
income held to be from sources outside United States since title passed in
India).
145Statutes in a few additional states contain phraseology peculiar to
the particular enactment. Section 10, Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929 provides
"The amount of sales which are transactions wholly in this state shall be
added to one-half of the amount of sales which are transactions partly
within this state, and ... shall be divided by the total sales . . .and the net
income shall be multiplied by the fraction . . . ;" Section 2297.1 of the
Montana, Rev. Laws 1935 provides that consideration shall be given the
"sales, property and payroll and such other factors as may be deemed
applicable;" Oklahoma in sec. 2 of art. 10 of ch. 66 of its 1939 Laws
amending sec. 12498h of Okla. Statutes 1936 Supp. in subsection (e) (3)
assigns a situs within the state to sales "in connection with the business
transacted partly within and partly without this state." The Missouri law
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legislature has selected one or more of the economic incidents to a
sale and enacted that they determine its situs. Under the office
situs rule those activities of a seller customarily centered at the
sales office, which are designed to induce customers to purchase,
are selected and made the criterion. These activities are obviously
material economic factors in the making of a sale. At the place
of delivery the decision to buy is generally made. There pur-
chasing power is found and the purchase price acquired. Material
economic factors are also operative here. The place of origin
may play some part in the making of a sale, for quick delivery
may frequently attract customers. Of some purport also is the
place of passing title, for there the seller first acquires legal
power to compel the buyer to remit the purchase price. Finally,
under the constructional rule, the court may select any one or more
of these or other factors as dominant and assign the sale a situs
where these factors may be said to be localized. The application
of these frequently conflicting rules furnishes a fruitful source of
double taxation. They may be considered in greater detail in
connection with various types of sales.
Mail order sales, solicited sales, branch office sales, warehouse
sales, consignment sales, brokerage sales and sales on exchanges
have already been discussed in connection with multi-state busi-
nesses.'4 6 A recurrent problem is whether the rules there dis-
cussed apply here. There is some authority that they do.1 47
Argument may be made to the contrary on the ground that the
jurisdictional considerations present in connection with the former
problem are absent here. No general answer may be made. It
depends in each state upon the construction as a whole of a
particular state income tax statute.
Mail orders may be received, accepted and filled from the
same office. In this situation all except the destination rule would
assign such sales a situs at the office.' 48  It is still an undecided
question whether the same result would be reached where the
has been construed in Artophone Corporation v. Coale, (1939) 345 Mo.
344, 133 S. W. (2d) 343; Burkhart Manufacturing Co. v. Coale, (1940)
345 Mo. 1131, 139 S. W. (2d) 502; and In the Matter of the Kansas City
Star, (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 1029.
14.See notes 86 through 102 above, and text.
'
47Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis. 516, 292
N. W. 897, and Baseball Publishing Co. v. Commission, (1933) 1 Mass.
B. T. A. 717.
148Op. Tenn. Att. Gen. March 1, 1939 in Tenn. C. C. H. Tax Service,
par. 4-010 holds that receipts from mail order sales to extra-state customers
were "gross receipts in Tennessee" within the meaning of the Tennessee
apportionment factor. See in accord cases cited in notes 87 and 88 above.
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economic incidents of the mail order sale become more widely
dispersed. 1 0  Probably it would.
The overlapping of rules is especially marked with respect
to solicited sales. The destination rule would assign these sales a
situs in the state of delivery. The origin rule would consistently
assign the same sales a different situs except in those instances in
which shipment took place within one state. Under the conflict
of laws rule the same sales might be localized in other states.
It would depend on where the act which passed title occurred.150
Under the office situs rule the salesman who induced the customer
to purchase might be connected with an office located in yet another
and different state. Thus, it has been held under the Massachu-
setts statute' 51 that sales solicited in other New England states
by salesmen travelling out of a Boston office were Massachusetts
sales, notnvithstanding the fact that the goods were shipped di-
rectly from the Pennsylvania factory to the New England cus-
tomer. 12 In another situation under the Wisconsin statute' 53 it
L49The order may be accepted by a branch office in one state and the
goods shipped from a main office or warehouse in another state; or there
may be various inter-branch arrangements which involve sales activities in
several states.
15 OIn Compania General v. Collector, (1929) 279 U. S. 306, 49 Sup. Ct.
304, 73 L. Ed. 704, the sales, the income from which was in question, were
localized at the place of the taxpayer's "principal office" in the Philippines,
where the sales were "subject to confirmation and absolute control as to
price and other terms" even though the goods were sold through an
"agency" in the United States to which country they were shipped. In
Commissioner v. East Oil Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1936) 85 Fed. (2d) 322,
the products were sold through agents in United States to customers there
who made payment there. The goods were delivered to common carriers
in Mexico although "ultimate delivery" was in the United States. They
were produced in Mexico where title passed. On this latter ground, the
court held them Mexican sales. In Briskey Co. v. Commissioner, (1934)
29 B. T. A. 987, the taxpayer had its principal place of business in the
United States, a branch office in India from which goods were shipped
to the home office or direct to customers to fill orders given orally at the
home office and transmitted by cable to India. The home office charged its
"branch" a commission for making sales. Title passed in India. For that
reason, the court held the sales to be localized there.
'
5
'Note 137 above and text.
-
5 2 Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, (1923) 244 Mass.
530, 139 N. E. 158 and (1923) 248 Mass. 156, 142 N. E. 762 reversed on
other grounds in 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L. Ed. 916. There a
N. J. corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement had its
principal office in Easton, Pa. and a branch office in Boston, Mass., which
was in charge of a district sales manager. It was also the headquarters for
travelling salesmen who solicited orders in Massachusetts and the other
New England states. Orders so taken were transmitted at the Boston
office by mail to the principal office where exclusively they were passed upon,
and, if accepted, the goods were shipped and invoices sent directly to the
customer. Remittances were generally made directly to Easton, Pa. There
was a clerk in the Boston office in charge of the company's correspondence.
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was held that purchase orders taken in the field by a non-resident
agent which were forwarded to the Wisconsin office for accept-
ance or rejection constituted Wisconsin sales.15 4 Under the con-
structional situs rule the phrase "sales within the state"'155 may
receive an interpretation similar to that of the phrase "business
within the state."'5 6 If so, there may be the same distinction be-
tween sales made by salesmen authorized only to solicit orders, *7
Its office furniture was valued at $573. On these facts, $424,982.70 of the
company's gross receipts were assigned a situs in Massachusetts. Com-
pare Baseball Publishing Co. v. Comm'n, (1933) 1 Mass. B. T. A. 717,
where in addition to the facts there stated it appeared that, "Many of the
appellant's contracts (were) negotiated in New York. . . ." The board
at page 721 held on the facts, however, "that no employee, except Birch
(the treasurer), was chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from
any premises outside the Commonwealth, and that no sales were negotiated
or effected in behalf of the appellant by agents or agencies chiefly situated
at, connected with or sent out from any such premises or were attributed to
business conducted on such premises." Compare with these two cases
California Packing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93
P. (2d) 463, which construes the Utah provision similarly worded.
153 Note 135 above and text.
154 Twin Disc Clutch Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, (Wis. B.T.A.,
Jan. 12, 1940) Wis. C. C. H. and P. H. Tax Services, pars. 10-827.015 and
13,458 respectively. Accord with respect to question of multi-state busi-
ness: Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis. 516, 292
N. W. 897. Here orders were secured by extra-state representatives who
apparently were connected with "offices" outside the state. All sales were
subject to approval at the home office with respect to price, credit, materials
and time of delivery. Billings were usually made from the home office. All
sales were held to be Wisconsin business.
15 5This is the phrase used in constructional situs statutes. See note
142 above.
15This is the phrase used in statutes involving the multi-state business.
See notes 9 and 23 above. Doing business within the state may in some
situations be equivalent to continuously making sales within the state. See
note 86 above.
157 In Curlee Clothing Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, (1937) 180 Okla.
116, 68 P. (2d) 834, sales of the Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. were also
involved. The salesmen had power to get orders and in addition authority
to show samples and collect 20 per cent of the purchase price as a down
payment. In holding that these additional powers were insufficient to create
a binding agreement in Oklahoma, the court said: "The fact that advance
collections were authorized did not serve to complete the sale in Okla-
homa." In People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis (1921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132
N. E. 109, 15 A. L. R. 1319 the court said: "He (Stafford) would not be
subject to an income tax in a foreign country, in which his travelling men
work." In both of the above cases, the question was whether income was de-
rived from "business, trade, profession, of occupation carried on (with)in
this state" under the respective statutes of Oklahoma and New York. In
People ex rel. Lummis v. Graves, (1937) 251 App. Div. 591, 297 N. Y. S.
967, the court held the business of the taxpayer to be carried on entirely
within the state even though travelling salesmen solicited orders outside
the state. In Cerf v. Lynch, (1932) 237 App. Div. 283, 261 N. Y. S. 231,
the general agent of a life insurance company was held to be carrying on
his business entirely within the state. In Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Com-
mission, (1935) 50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S. E. 563, it was held that sales
solicited by salesmen outside the state and subject to buyers' confirmation
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and those by salesmen authorized to enter into consummated agree-
ments of purchase and sale.15 The effect upon the situs of sales
of the power of confirmation at the home office has varied from
case to case. Sales have been held to have a situs at the place of
confirmation'" and the reverse. 6 0 A distinction might be predi-
constituted business carried on entirely in the state of the home office. In
Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, (1922) 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct.
305, 66 L. Ed. 622, there was involved a tax upon the proportion of the
taxpayer's "capital stock represented by its property and business in Illinois."
One of the factors in the proportion was "total business" in Illinois over
total business everywhere. The taxpayer's plant, principal office, and
"storeroom" were in Chicago. It had travelling salesmen in many of the
states of the union soliciting orders. The court held all the company's
business was located in Chicago.
1 8 People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, (1921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E.
109, 15 A. L. R. 1319, and People ex rel. Monjo v. State Tax Comm'n,
(1926) 218 App. Div. 1, 217 N. Y. S. 669, both held that sales closed
abroad by duly authorized agents there acting constituted business outside
the state. See People ex rel. Charles Kohlman & Co. v. Law, (1925) 239
N. Y. 346. 146 N. E. 622, and People ex rel. American Woolen Products
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1926) 213 App. Div. 493, 211 N. Y. S. 10.
"OBy tribunals of the state of confirmation: Twin Disc Clutch Co. v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, Wis. B. T. A. Jan. 12, 1940, note 154 above,
("Purchase orders taken in the field by the nonresident agent . . . which
are forwarded to the Wisconsin office for acceptance or rejection" are
Wisconsin sales), Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis.
516, 292 N. W. 897 (holding entire business done in Wisconsin), Appeal
of Combined Locks Paper Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Feb. 1, 1939), Wis.
C. C. H. and P. H. Tax Services, pars. 14-562 and 13,348, accord, Hump
Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, (1920) 293 Ill. 387, 127 N. E. 746, aff'd
258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 305, 66 L. Ed. 622. ("These orders are mailed
to . . . Chicago and upon acceptance its products are shipped") and see
Montag Bros. v. State Rev. Comm'n, (1935) 50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S. E.
563 (Buyers' confirmation also involved) and People ex rel. Charles
Kohlman & Co., (1925) 239 N. Y. 346, 146 N. E. 622 (New York ac-
counts receivable factor) ; by tribunals of a state other than that of
confirmation: Curlee Clothing Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, (1937) 180
Okla. 116, 68 P. (2d) 834. The court said: "This court has repeatedly
held that the sales of goods by a foreign corporation through soliciting
agents, who take orders subject to approval of the company at its home
office, does not constitute doing business within this state.") Where con-
firmation passes title the conflict of laws rule (note 150 above) coincides
with the rule of the above cases. The distinction between the rules is noted,
however, in Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Comm'n, above where the
court said: "The fact that . . . the title to some of the goods may have
passed to purchasers outside the state, . . . would not relieve the seller
from tax. . ."
16 OBy tribunals of the state of confirmation: Carlos Ruggles Lumber
Co. v. Commonwealth, (1927) 261 Mass. 450, 158 N. E. 899 ("all sales were
made subject to confirmation at the home office in Springfield." Held: the
taxpayer was doing business both within and without the state). By
tribunals of states other than that of confirmation: Laurentide Co. v. Dury,
(N.D. N.Y. 1916) 231 Fed. 223 (orders solicited in the U. S. were sent
"to the home office of the company in Canada for acceptance or approval"-
P. 226. Held: the taxpayer was doing business in the United States),
People ex rel. Lummis v. Graves, (1937) 251 App. Div. 591, 297 N. Y. S. 967
("His duties were to solicit orders, all of which were subject to confirmation
or rejection by the employer" in Ohio. Held: the taxpayer-employee was
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cated on the basis that some decisions were with respect to situa-
tions in which confirmation was merely a formal and unexercised
power, and some were with respect to situations in which the
power was actually availed of to check credit, price, terms and
conditions of sale. This possible distinction will not, however,
reconcile all the cases. No all inclusive rule may be stated with
respect to the effect of the power of confirmation upon the situs
of sales.
Branch office sales made without solicitation through local
retail stores are commonly considered to be localized at the
store. Ordinarily, goods sold at such a branch are from stock
to local customers. Under such circumstances title would gener-
ally pass at the store. Consequently, the origin, destination and
conflict rules would in the usual case reach the same result as
would also, quite clearly, the office situs rule. Since practically
all the economic incidents of the sale occur at the store, the con-
structional rule would create no exception. It has been ruled
under the sales ratio provision of the Wisconsin allocation frac-
tion that sales from a Wisconsin branch have a situs within Wis-
consin.16 1 In accord are the decisions involving the correspond-
ing problem with respect to a multi-state business.16 2
With respect to warehouse sales the decisions, as well as
the statutes, are not in harmony. One court, applying the con-
structional rule, has localized these sales at the warehouse. 16 3
On the other hand, a court of the state of the factory and home
engaged in business in New York), Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Common-
wealth, (1923) 244 Mass. 530, 130 N. E. 158 and (1923) 248 Mass. 156, 142
N. E. 762. See American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, (1917) 270 Mo. 40,
192 S. W. 402 aff'd on second appeal 198 S. W. 1183 and 250 U. S. 459,
39 Sup. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed. 1084 ("substantially all . . . sales, though
negotiated here, of merchandise stored in this and other cities are con-
firmed by and are not effective until they are confirmed by the home office
in New York." Held: sales of all goods manufactured in St. Louis were
properly included in the "sales made" measure of the tax imposed upon
the privilege of manufacturing).
16'In a ruling of the Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1926) in par. 11,157
of P. H. Wis. Tax Service it was held there must be an allocation of the
income of a taxpayer engaged in the business of selling and underwriting
bonds.162Cases cited note 95 above.
'163 California Packing Corporation v. State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97
Utah *367, 93 P. (2d) 463, involved a packing company with its principal
office in California. It made "sales of goods which were stored in Utah
at the time of the sale although such sales were made by agents sent out
from California offices." The tax commission held that the "sales of goods
which were stored in Utah at the time of sale regardless of whether the
sales were made in Utah to Utah concerns or concerns in other states"
were to be included in the numerator of the sales ratio of the apportion-
ment fraction. The court affirmed the greater part of the commission's order.
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office has held that sales to extra-state customers of goods ware-
housed outside the state were "made" locally in so far as in-
clusion within the measure of the manufacturers' privilege tax
in question was involved.1 64 Taxpayers have also not been con-
sidered to be doing business outside the state solely by reason
of warehouses there located. 6 5 This rule has some merit. It
avoids some degree of manipulation by reason of change in loca-
tion of the warehouse. It avoids undue emphasis upon an eco-
nomic incident of a sale relatively unimportant in the usual case,
as compared with the activities of the seller and the contribution
of the buyer.16 6 Furthermore, warehousing may be considered
as the performance of a separate business function of storage
and considered independently of sales. 6 ' Whether this will be
the final rule of the courts awaits, however, their decision.
It has been ruled that a brokerage sale 68 does not, for the
purpose of the sales ratio, necessarily have a situs where the
broker is. This ruling involved a taxpayer which had its prin-
cipal office in California with customers outside the state to
whom sales were made through extra-state brokers. 69 The same
board reached a similar result in cases raising the corresponding
question with respect to a multi-state businessY.7 0 The reasoning
of these cases is not explicit. Possibly the broker's activities on
behalf of the buyer were considered dominant and the broker
regarded more as the buyer's agent than the seller'sY.1 7 Possibly
164American Manufacturing Co. v. City of St. Louis, (1917) 270 Mo.
40, 192 S. W. 402, aff'd 250 U. S. 459, 39 Sup. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed. 1084. The
case should probably be restricted to its facts although it has been cited
with approval in some recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
I6-See notes 99 through 101, text and cases cited.
16 in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., (1940) 309 U. S. 33,
60 Sup. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565, the court sustained a sales tax imposed by
the state of the location of the purchaser and branch sales office even
though the goods were situated outside the state.167See notes 69, 70 above and text.
168Section 1 of Brokers in 12 C. J. S. at page 5 defines a broker as
"one who is engaged for others, on a commission, to negotiate contracts
relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern." The
Restatement of Agency in comment b to sec. 2 refers to a "broker who
contracts to sell goods for his principal" as "an independent contractor"
defined in sec. 2 (3) as "a person who contracts with another to do some-
thing for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the per-
formance of his undertaking."
160Appeal of El Dorado Oil Works, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15,
1939) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.017.
17 0See cases cited note 97 above, and text.
UhIn this aspect a brokerage sale would resemble a mail order sale: in
one the buyer sends a mail order to the seller who then ships the goods;
in the other the buyer sends a mail order through a broker to the seller
who then ships the goods.
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viewed as controlling were those authorities to the effect that a
foreign corporation is not subject to service 72 or qualification 1 73
within a foreign state merely by reason of its brokers there. Some
economic factors might appear to be to the contrary. 7 4 In this
situation, however, they are pfobably of less weight than the
legal ones.
Consignment sales' 7 5 resemble in some aspects both broker-
age and warehouse sales. Generally, brokers and consignees are
both considered to be independent contractors. Moreover, consign-
ment sales, like warehouse sales, involve merchandise in storage.
If consignment sales are regarded as brokerage sales, the place
of the consignee would not alone determine their situs; if they
are treated as warehouse sales, the place of consignment would
not alone be determinative. 1 76 The courts may give some recogni-
tion to these conclusions. In one decision in which reference was
made in passing to "consigned stocks" located outside the state,
it was held that no sales business was there carried on. 177 It has
been ruled that goods on consignment outside the state are to be
included in the numerator of the property ratio of an apportion-
ment fractionY.8 A state regulation is in accordY.7  Foreign cor-
172Abramovich v. Continental Can Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 151, 207
N. W. 201 and see 18 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (1933) 373,
sec. 8718.
'73See 17 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, (1933) 512, secs. 8482
and 8483.
'
74The broker, in reality, may among other things be the active solicitor
of sales, may have power to enter binding contracts of sale in behalf of the
seller, may have power to make immediate delivery from local warehouses.
The purchaser's economic contribution to the sale may also be localized at
the place of the broker. Much might be said that the real economic
increment is earned at that place.
'7.It is often a difficult question of fact to determine whether there
is a consignment or sale as between consignor and consignee. 1 Williston,
Sales (2d Ed. 1924) sec. 338. In a general way, the term consignment
sales is here used to include sales made by a factor of goods in his
possession as bailee.
176See notes 164, 165, 189, 170 and text above.
'
77Trane Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1940) 235 Wis. 516, 292
N. W. 897.
17sAppeal of Heil Company, (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Oct. 20, 1933) Wis.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-827.09. " . . . consignment stocks in the
hands of dealer located outside Wisconsin must be treated for apportion-
ment purposes as property owned and used in connection with the taxpayer's
Wisconsin business when such goods are shipped on consignment pursuant
to orders taken through the taxpayer's Milwaukee office and when sold
the sales are treated as sales by that office."
'
79Art. 23-4 of the 1939 Regulations to the Income and Franchise Tax
Act of Minnesota in Minn. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-728: "Where
a Minnesota concern ships goods on consignment to a factor in another
state, such goods to be sold by the factor, who pays the consignor after the
goods are sold, such transaction is considered as Minnesota business."
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poration qualification statutes present an analogy which should
be noted, 10 together with its limitation.-"
The few available authorities with respect to sales on ex-
changes have reached conflicting conclusions. It has been held
that a California company was not doing business in New York
by virtue of its trading on margin there.8 2 On the other hand
it was stipulated in one case that sales of a North Dakota con-
cern on M1innesota grain exchanges were Minnesota sales." 3
A stock exchange seat has been held to have a situs at the ex-
change.' 14  To the extent that exchange sales resemble brokerage
sales there is further authority in support of the California rule.8 5
Under constructional situs statutes it is conceivable that in ex-
ceptional factual situations sales might be localized at the ex-
change. 18 The whole situation awaits further clarification by
the courts.
2. The Property Ratio.-It has already been observed that
the property ratio is prima facie valid.18 7 It has also been sus-
tained against the contention that it discriminates between busi-
nesses which own their properties and businesses which hold their
properties as lessees. 8 The same accounts receivable may not
thice be included in the numerator of this factor.18
18017 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (1933) 520, sec. 8484.
1811t has been held that a foreign corporation may so closely supervise
the activities of its consignee-agent that it may be considered to be doing
business within the meaning of foreign corporation qualification statutes.
17 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (1933) sec. 8484. Note 23 and text.
182Appeal of Henry Investment Co., (Cal. St. Ed. of Equal., Mar. 15,
1933) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-802.08.
183International Elevator Co. v. Thoresen, (1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228
N. W. 192. The company was selling grain "outside of North Dakota,
principally on the grain exchanges in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth."
"It is further stipulated that at least 90 per cent of the plaintiff's gross
sale . . . was made in states other than North Dakota." The taxpayer's
home office was probably in Minnesota.
'
84People ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, (1937) 299 U. S. 366, 57 Sup. Ct.
237, 81 L. Ed. 285.
'sfSee note 169, 170 above and text.
'68 See note 181 above.
187See note 124 above and text. In International Elevator Co. v.
Thoresen, (1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228 N. W. 192, the court said: "Ownership
of property is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration in
apportioning income, and there can be no doubt that it has legitimate
bearing in effecting a fair distribution of the profits or income ......
18 8At least in the absence of proof of specific discrimination. Inter-
national Elevator Co. v. Thoresen, (1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228 N. W. 192.
The court said: "It is next said that the plaintiff is denied the equal pro-
tection of the law, in that the method . . . works discrimination in favor
of those doing a similar business who lease, rather than own, elevators
within the state. It was not proved upon the trial that there were any
concerns doing similar business who made it a practice to lease elevators
within this state while owning them elsewhere."
18OPeople ex rel. Societe Anonyme Des Anciens Etablissements, E. & E.
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The statutory provisions incorporating the property ratio
vary considerably with respect both to the method and time of
valuation of the properties therein. In one state the valuation is
to be taken as of the close of the preceding taxable period.900 In
three states there are provisions for valuation at the end of the
taxable year."9' Many states have adopted provisions for taking
the average of the values at the beginning and end of the taxable
year 92 with the alternative provision, in certain instances, 193 of a
monthly or daily average in case the first prescribed average
should prove unfair. In some jurisdictions statutes prescribe
that the average monthly value be taken as the standard. 94 Still
other statutes refer to the average value during the year without
further specifications. 1 5 In many instances no reference what-
ever is made to the time at which the valuation is to be made.'
No uniform method of valuation obtains. A few statutes
refer to the "fair market value'19 7 or to the "fair cash value"' 98
or to "actual value."' 99 Others define value as cost.29 9 In several
Chapel Freres & Cie v. Knapp, (1920) 191 App. Div. 701, 182 N. Y. S.
448, aff'd 230 N. Y. 557, 130 N. E. 892.
19 0Art. 247 of the Regulations No. 5, Mississippi: "Cost value of capital




'North Carolina, Laws 1939 ch. 158, sec. 311, II, 1 (a) and 2 (a)-
"value . . . on the date of the close of the calendar or fiscal year ... ;"
Tennessee, 1940 Supplement to Williams Code, sec. 1316 (1) (a)-"value
• on the date of the close of the fiscal year . . . ;" Virginia: Tax Code,
ch. 6, sec. 54--"value ... at the close of the taxable year...."
192California: art. 7 (f)-4(d) of Regulations, note 16 above; Colorado,
Laws 1937, ch. 175, sec. 17; Kansas, Gen. Stat., sec. 79-3218 as amended
in 1937, ch. 370, sec. 3; Louisiana, art. 216 of Regulations, note 135 above;
Minnesota, Mason's 1940 Supplement, sec. 2394-25 (A) (4); New
York, Unincorporated Business Tax Act, note 135 above, sec. 386-g;
Oklahoma, Laws 1939, ch. 66, art. 10, sec. 2 (e) (3); Oregon, art. 182
of 1938 Regulations, note 141 above.
'93Maryland, Regulation No. 3, note 138 above; South Carolina, Code
1932, sec. 2451 (1) ; United States Regulations 101, art. 119-12 at page 344.
194Connecticut, Gen. Stat., 1939 Supp., sec. 356-e; District of Columbia,
art. 3 (b) (1), note 142 above; New York, Corporate "franchise" tax
act in McKinley's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 59, Tit. 9-A,
sec. 214.
195Kentucky, Statutes (Carroll 1936) sec. 32 (2) (c) (C); North
Dakota, Compiled Laws 1925 Supp. sec. 2346a6, (2), (c) (2) ; Utah, Rev.
Stat. 80-13-21 (6).
'
5 8Arizona, Rev. Code Supp. 1934, sec. 3182x, (a), 1; California,
Franchise tax act, note 254 below; Georgia, 1939 Code, sec. 92-3113;
Massachusetts, Gen. L., ch. 63, sec. 38 (2) (a); Pennsylvania, Purdon's
Statutes Supp., Tit. 72, sec. 3420b; South Dakota, Code 1939, sec. 57.2707;
Wisconsin, Statutes 1939, sec. 71.02 (3) (d) 1.
'
97 3ec. 54 of Virginia, Tax Code, ch. 6.
198Sec. 356e of Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1939 Supplement.
'
99Sec. 214-9 of New York, Law note 194 above; South Carolina, Code
1932, sec. 2451; art. 119-12 of U. S. Regulations note 193 above.20OThe Kansas law, note 192 above, refers to the "average cost" of the
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states adjusted book values are determinative. 20 1 Many statutes
and regulations are less specific and merely refer generally to
the "value" of the taxpayer's property.202 In some instances men-
tion of value is entirely omitted.20 3 It is the value of the property
and not the value of the taxpayer's interest in the property which
is taken into consideration.
2 0
The numerator of the fraction may include only those prop-
erties within the state215 owned or used by the taxpayer in con-
nection with its business. 208  Some specifically exclude those
assets, the income from which is separately allocable or not tax-
property. The Mississippi Regulations, note 180 above, uses the phrase "cost
value of capital assets." The Colorado, Laws 1937, ch. 175, makes reference
to "the average adjusted basis" which generally would be the cost basis
adjusted for depreciation, etc. Art. 25-1 of the 1939 Minnesota Regulations,
Minn. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14740, provides that value "shall be the
cost or other allowable income tax basis adjusted for allowable deprecia-
tion." The Oregon Regulations, note 192 above, in art. 184 refer to the
"average of the depreciated cost or other allowable basis." The Oklahoma
Laws 1939, ch. 66, sec. 2 (e) 3 refer to "average accumulated investment."
20 The Louisiana Regulations, note 192 above, require the elimination
of appreciation from book values together with the deduction of accumulated
reserve balances. The North Carolina statute note 191 above in sub-sections
1 (1) and 2 (e) provides that "book value" shall mean original cost plus
additions and improvements less reserve for depreciation. An opinion of the
North Carolina Att. Gen. of August 18, 1938 in N. C. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 10,809.01, ruled that the value of inventories is their book
value. Art. 119-12 of the U. S. Regulations and sec. 2451 (1) of the
South Carolina, Code 1932, sec. 2451, provide in certain instances that
values are presumptively the book values. See Thornhill Wagon Co. v.
Commonwealth, (1926) 144 Va. 194, 131 S. E. 445.202California Regulations, District of Columbia Regulations and statutes
of Kentucky, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Utah
in notes 192, 194, 195, 193, 196, 192, 195, 196, 191 and 195 respectively above.
203Arizona, California, Georgia, Minnesota, South Dakota and Wis-
consin statutes in notes 196 and 192 above.20
'Several statutes expressly disallow deductions for encumbrances.
Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, notes 194,
191, 193 and 191 respectively above.
205Goods stored outside the state may not be included in the numera-
tor of the property ratio. Op. N. C. Att. Gen. Feb. 14, 1930, N. C. P. H.
Tax Service, par. 10,920.9 and N. C. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-804.01.
However, it has been held that goods on consignment outside the state may
be so included (Appeal of Heil Co., Wis. Tax Comm'n, Oct. 20, 1933)
Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-827.09) and that raw materials purchased
and processed by others outside the state should be included (Marinette
Knitting Mills v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, C. C. Dane County, Sept.
23, 1940 Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-709). Also where property
is moved in and out of the state a time ratio proportion of such property
should be considered to have its location within the state. Ruling of
Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1924) Wis. P. H. Tax Service, par. 11,148,
No. 788.
208Ruling (Wis. Tax Comm'n, March 11, 1924) Wis. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 10-827.07 (value of building under construction and not
used in business excluded).
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able. Both of these general provisions are in harmony with the
constitutional limitations already discussed.20 7
3. The Wage Ratio.-Wages are assigned a situs under vary-
ing rules. In several states they are localized where the services
for which the compensation is paid are rendered. 28 It should be
noted that under this rule the situs of wages is assigned to that
state in which the wage income would be taxed to the em-
ployee. 0 9 Consequently, those cases involving the taxation at
source of income from personal services would, by analogy, be
pertinent here.2 11 In other states, which constitute a majority,
payroll is assigned a situs at the place at or from which the em-
ployees work.2 11 The similarity of this rule to the office situs
sales rule is apparent. 12 In one case arising under the Massa-
chusetts statute the court assigned compensation paid salesmen
travelling from a Boston office, who solicited orders in the New
207See note 110 above and text.
208California, Regulations to Personal Income Tax Act of 1935 as
amended in 1937, art. 7 (f) 4 (d) note 16 above (" . . . the total wages,
salaries, and other compensation for personal services performed (a) with-
in the state . . . ") ; California, Corporate Franchise Act, Instruc-
tions in Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, p. 597 ("Salaries, wages, or other
compensation of officers and employees should be entered as within the
state if the services are actually performed here . . . ;") see Minnesota,
Mason's 1940 Supplement, sec. 2394-25 (A) (1) (c) (... payrolls paid or
incurred in this state or paid in respect to labor performed in this
state ...... ") But compare art. 25-1 of the Minnesota Regulations, note 200
above, "The wages or salaries paid to officers and employees working from
Minnesota offices are considered as Minnesota payroll even though their
employment requires them to spend working time without this state." If
the services in question are those of an officer or employee who travels
in and out of the state during the year a time ratio or other proportion
thereof may be localized within the state. See California Regulations,
"Compensation of officers and employees whose services are performed
partly within and partly without this state should be allocated either on a
mileage basis, on the basis of time spent within this state, or on some
other suitable bases."209Some states tax income from personal services to resident taxpayers
regardless of the place it is earned. Other states tax such income "at
source" if the services are performed within the state. It is to the latter
rule to which reference is made.2 1
oSee note 15 above and text.
21lConnecticut, Gen. Stat. 1939 Supp. sec. 356e; North Dakota, Statutes,
(2) of subsection (c) of sec. 2346a6-2 provide that wage payments shall
be "assigned to the office, agency or place of business . . . at which the
employee chiefly works, or from which he is sent out or with which he
is chiefly connected...." Massachusetts, Gen. L., ch. 63, sec. 38 5, Pennsyl-
vania (Purdon's Statutes as amended sec. 3420b, 2c (c) (3) ) and Utah,
Revised Statutes 1933, sec. 80-13-21 (6) (d) have enacted the following
rule: "The amount assignable . . . for wages . . . shall be such expendi-
ture(s) . . . as represent(s) the . . . compensation of employe(e)s not
chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from premises for the transac-
tion of business" owned, rented or maintained outside the state. See
Minnesota Regulations and statute in note 208 above.
212See notes 135 through 138 above and text (especially note 137).
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England states, a Massachusetts situs.2 1 3 The Massachusetts
Board of Tax Appeals has also in one case refused to assign
sales commissions a New York situs. 214 A third and minority rule
assigns payroll a situs within the state if "paid during the taxable
year to employees in connection with [the] business carried on
within the state." 2115 The statute of yet another state may also
have adopted, in addition to the situs rule, one including wages
paid from within the state.216 Most statutes, of course, expressly
limit the payroll period to the taxable year. A few have specified
that payroll includes executives' salaries.2 17
B. Allocation by a Separate Accounting.-An allocation
by a separate accounting is not an unconditional right of the
taxpayer. In some states it is denied altogether. 2 8 In others it is
dependent on the taxpayer's proof that its accounts are a true
and accurate record of actual transactions and that they are so
kept as to dearly reflect net income from within the state; or
on proof, in addition to the accuracy of the accounts, of the in-
appropriateness of the apportionment fraction; or on proof that
the nature of the business is susceptible to a separate accounting.
Whether the state, as well as the taxpayer, also has the condi-
tional right to a separate accounting has not yet been specifically
decided. The indications are that it does.
219
213Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, (1923) 244 Mass.
530, 139 N. E. 158. The Massachusetts court in holding wages as well
as sales had a Massachusetts situs said: "The same reasoning applies to
the suggestion that the tax is invalid because wages paid in connection with
the Massachusetts office included in part services rendered by travelling
salesmen going to other states as well as Massachusetts."214Baseball Publishing Co. v. Commission, (1933) 1 Mass. B. T. A.
717. At page 721 it was noted that "two of the three salesmen spend
some of their time in the New York office." The board's ruling is stated
in notes 152 and 96 above.
215Louisiana, Regulations, note 135 above, art. 216; New York, Un-
incorporated Business Tax Act, note 135 above, art. 16, sec. 386 (g) 2;
Oregon, Regulations, note 141 above, art. 182. Under this rule wages paid
employees in states in which no business was done would not be included.
The rule is also vague.
2 6ltfinnesota. The statute in note 208 above includes "payroll paid
or incurred in this state."
2 1 California, The corporate franchise act specifically mentions officers
and employees; see notes 142 and 196 above. Many of the statutes cited use
language broad enough to reach a similar result.
2lsOpinions N. C. Att. Gen. Dec. 28, 1935 and June 11, 1937 in N. C.
C. C. H. and P. H. Tax Services, pars. 10-803.20, .21 and 10,920.1
respectively.
2 19Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (E.D. Wis. 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 385, 391. Here a dealer in automobiles was, at the instance of the
tax commission, required to compute its income on a separate accounting
basis, there being an ascertainable market price for Buicks.
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The statutes or regulations of most states generally provide
that accounts must "accurately" or "clearly" reflect net income.
Some specifically exclude bookkeeping records based on estimate
or artificial billings. Thus, regulations have provided that "Ar-
bitrary billing prices based upon factory cost will not be con-
sidered as properly reflecting the gross income of either the manu-
facturing or selling departments. 2 2 0 In one case a separate ac-
counting was denied where the taxpayer limited itself to a show-
ing that the Wisconsin branch in question was billed "at the
same price we make all our branch managers" and failed to offer
proof with respect to prices charged independent dealers for the
same products.2 2 1 In another case the court reached the same
result where the taxpayer's books reflected only estimated ex-
penses. 222 Decisions with respect to artificial billings based upon
inter-corporate contracts of affiliated corporations have already
been cited.223 The fictitious prices were disregarded.
In some states the apportionment fraction is presumed to be
correct.224 Here the taxpayer, in addition to the burden of prov-
ing the accuracy of its accounts,22- must rebut the prima facie
presumption by showing that allocation is more accurately made
by a separate accounting than by a statutory apportionment.
2 2 0Arizona, art. 606 of Regulations, Ariz. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
10-343, p. 247-51; Kansas, 1935 Regulations, art. 79; Wisconsin, 1932
Regulations, art. 602.1. Compare 1939 Minnesota Regulations, art. 26-1.221 Appeal of Holland Furnace Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Oct. 5, 1936)
Wis. C. C. H. and P. H. Tax Services, pars. 10-827.10 and 13,230 respec-
tively.
222S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 353, 355.
The court said, "These later charges against the gross income in New
York are merely estimated expenses of the business. The plaintiff urges
that they are a close estimate because .. .charges . . .come within $67,000
of the actual expenses; but they remain nevertheless mere estimates."
2 2 3See note 47 above.
2 2 4See note 124 above and text. Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1940
Supplement provides in sec. 2394-26 that the "methods prescribed by Section
25 shall be presumed to determine fairly and correctly the taxpayer's net
income allocable to this state."
2 2 5This might be the only burden upon the taxpayer in those states in
which some preference may be given to a separate accounting. Here a
fractional apportionment would apparently be allowed by way of exception.
See statutes and regulations in Colorado,. Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New
Mexico, New York (unincorporated business tax act), Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Virginia where allocation by apportionment formula is
allowed only in case the "books of account and records do not clearly
reflect the net income;" or "when the books" fail to "show income derived
from business done" within the state; or "where the books of account and
records do not substantially reflect the net income;" or when a separate
accounting does not "reasonably reflect the income properly assignable to
this state ;" or, where it is "unpractible." See Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, note 70 above.
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Furthermore, the inaccuracy must be in such degree as to result
in "unfairness" or "injustice. ' '226 Whether this question of degree
is the same as that involving the constitutional "right" to a
separate accounting is an open question. 2 7 Possibly not. Further-
more, the statutes of some states provide that proof must be to
the "satisfaction" of the tax authority.228 Under these provisions
anything less than complete disclosure of the taxpayer's books
would be insufficient.229
In some states a separate accounting may be preferred for
one type of business and a statutory apportionment for another.2 30
Generally construction and mercantile businesses fall within the
first category and manufacturing within the second.231 By way
-
2
'See statutes and regulations in California (franchise tax act), Dis-
trict of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah and United States. In these
states a separate accounting is allowed only where the fraction is "in-
applicable or inequitable," or is "not reasonably adopted to approximate"
the right result; or does not allocate the portion of income "fairly and
equitably attributable to" the state; or would work "hardship or injustice ;"
or would not "correctly reflect" or "properly reflect" income from within
the state; or where a separate accounting "more clearly" reflects the
income within the state.22
7See notes 125 to 132 above, and text.22BIowa, art. 224 of 1938 Regulations and South Carolina, sec. 2451
(1) of 1932 code provide that proof must be "to the satisfaction" of the
tax official. Arizona, Statutes 1934 Supp., see. 3182x, North Dakota, sec.
2346a7 (2) of Statutes as amended in 1931, South Dakota, Code 1939, sec.
57.2707, and Wisconsin, Statutes 1939, sec. 71.02 (3) (d) provide for a
separate accounting when "in the judgment of" the tax commission or
director of taxation the method of separate accounting "will reasonably
reflect the income properly assignable" to the state. Colorado, sec. 16 of
income tax act, note 140 above, and Idaho, Reg. No. 49, art. 8 provide that
a separate accounting shall be "subject to approval of" the state tax official.229In S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 353,
a separate accounting was denied where the taxpayer refused to show
its books and furnish "competent proof" and was granted in Standard Oil
Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1929) 197 Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85, where
"the tax commission .. .had full access to all the records of the plain-
tiff company."2 1)0See Regulations in Arizona, Louisiana and Wisconsin. Art. 602.1
of the 1932 Wisconsin Regulations (Wis. C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 10-820)
provides in part, "When the nature of the business will permit of a separate
accounting for Wisconsin business which will clearly reflect taxable income,
this method should be used in preference to the apportionment method."
See ruling of Wis. Tax Comm'n in Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par.
10-820.01.
231Art. 606 of the Arizona Regulations (Ariz. C.C.H. Tax Service,
par. 10-343) and art. 602.1 of the Wisconsin Regulations note 230 above
provide, in general, that "merchandising and construction businesses will
permit of a separate accounting while manufacturing businesses will require
the use of the apportionment method." In Arizona (Art. 606 above),
Louisiana (Art. 214) and Wisconsin (Art. 602-1 above) there is the addi-
tional provision, "When the segregated (separate) method of accounting
is used, separate accounting records must be kept of sales, cost of sales and
expenses for the (Arizona, Louisiana, or Wisconsin) business. . . . Over-
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of exception, however, separate accounting may be allowed a
manufacturing concern in those instances in which the factory
product has a "definitely determinable market value. '232 The
allocation of the income of a construction business has been in-
directly involved in several decisions without specific mention of
the present problems.233 With respect to mercantile concerns, how-
ever, separate accounting has been approved with respect to the
branch stores of Montgomery Ward & Co. 23 4 but not with re-
head items of income and expense must then be allocated... . For example,
the ratio of . . . sales . . . usually represents a satisfactory basis for a
merchandising business while the ratio of direct cost of material and labor
gives a more accurate result for a construction business." Art. 79
of the 1935 Kansas Regulations is substantially the same. The South
Dakota regulations allow a separate accounting where the cost of merchan-
dise to the selling branch within the state is identical with the cost of such
merchandise to the company as a whole.
23 2Arizona, Art. 606 of Regulations above; Wisconsin, Art. 602-1 of
Regulations above. The Idaho regulations permit manufacturing concerns
to report on a separate accounting basis where selling is conducted in such
a manner "as to establish fairly an independent factory or production price."
Art. 224 of the Iowa Regulations (Iowa C.C.H. Tax Service, p. 1498-87)
and Art. 79 of the Kansas Regulations above provide generally that the
separate accounting method is not satisfactory or reflective of correct taxa-
ble income in the case of manufacturing concerns.
23 3 James V. Dravo Contracting Company, (1937) 302 U. S. 134, 58
Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318 (here a Pennsylvania Com-
pany contracted to build locks and dams in West Virginia. It furnished
certain steel parts from its factory in Pennsylvania. Other materials and
labor were secured from both within and without the state. There was a
remand for failure to make an allocation of any type whatsoever). Koppers
Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (1926) 191 Wis. 397, 211 N. W. 147. (here
a Pennsylvania Company sold from its factory in Pennsylvania coke and
gas ovens which were installed, under the taxpayer's supervision, by the
purchaser in Wisconsin. To the extent that the taxpayer performed
services in Wisconsin, tax liability was admitted. However, the court
treated the project as a sale and the question of allocation did not arise.)
Appeal of Stebbins Engineering and Manufacturing Co., (Wisconsin Tax
Comm'n, Nov. 3, 1938) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 14-546. Here,
a New York company sold linings to digesters and other equipment used
in the paper business. Installation was made by the New York company in
Wisconsin where its employees and labor were engaged. The linings were
of brick manufactured by the company in Pennsylvania. The method of
allocation, having been the subject of stilvulation, was not discussed.) In
Appeal of Thebo, Starr and Anderson Inc., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., April
23, 1934) Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.015, an allocation was
denied on the ground that no business was done outside the state. The
taxpayer had its principal office in California, had no permanent offices
nor investment outside the state and was not qualified to do business there.
It had engineers supervising the installation of several butane gas plants in
Washington and Oregon and selected some of the crews of workmen
there. Both were paid direct by the Washington and Oregon companies.
The plans were drafted in California and the taxpayer was paid com-
missions based on a percentage of cost.
234 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151 Kan.
159, 98 P. (2d) 143.
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spect to a wholesale house,23 5 It has also received judicial recog-
nition in connection with the local branches, separately incor-
porated, of a chain store, there being a proper allocation of over-
head.238 Its propriety has been assumed in certain other deci-
sions.2 37 A manufacturing concern is not entitled to a separate ac-
counting in the usual case.2 38 However, in three cases involving
the Standard Oil Company it was decided that a separate ac-
counting should be allowed as a matter of right where the mer-
chandise in question had a readily determinable market price.
2 19
The same principle also has been applied with respect to Buick
dealers where the same condition existed.2 40 In a few cases it
may have been allowed, although not as a matter of right, even
235Butler Bros. v. McColgan, (Cal. 1941) 111 P. (2d) 334. Here
there was involved an Illinois corporation with a principal office in Chicago
and seven wholesale houses in various parts of the United States which was
engaged in the wholesale dry goods and general merchandise business, pur-
chasing from manufacturers and others, and selling to retailors only. The San
Francisco house maintained stocks of goods there from which sales were
made and handled its own solicitation, credit, collections and accounting. The
only common expenses were executive salaries, general overhead, advertising
and buying, a portion of each of which was apportioned to California. The
supreme court reversed the lower court which had approved a separate
accounting as a method of allocation "fairly calculated to assign to the
state the portion of net income reasonably attributable to the business done"
in California in 102 P. (2d) 334 and upheld an allocation by a three way
formula of tangible property, payroll and gross sales.
220J. G. McCrary v. Commission of Corps. and Taxation, (1932) 280
Mass. 273, 182 N. E. 481. The Board of Tax Appeals below found: "The
appellant had separate books of account from which its return was made
up, and the facts and figures stated in the return were true and accurate....
We find . . . that the earnings shown by the return and by the appellant's
books of account were its true earnings."23 7People ex rel. Monjo v. State Tax Comm'n, (1926) 218 App. Div.
1, 217 N. Y. S. 669; State v. Weil, (1936) 232 Ala. 578, 168 So. 679, aff'd
on rehearing 237 Ala. 293, 186 So. 467.
3A separate accounting has been denied a manufacturing concern with
plants in several states notwithstanding the availability of separate accounts
for each plant. Op. Tenn. Att. Gen. Nov. 1, 1937, Tenn. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 10-807.16. See also Appeal of Holland Furnace Co. note
221 above.
2-3Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1929) 197
Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85 ("The statute does not enjoin upon the commission
the use of that method which will produce the largest amount of taxable
income but rather that method which will most justly apportion the income
properly taxable in Wisconsin;" Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 708 ("It is conceded to be a very easy matter
for the state to determine the market value of refined oils within its
borders . . . and on this, having ascertained the selling price, to determine
the tax necessary to be paid.") See Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 744, 747 where "two per cent was added as
profit to the cost of producing, manufacturing, and refining." Compare
note 50 above. Compare Butler Bros. v. McColgan (Cal. 1941) 111 P. (2d)
334.
40Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, (E.D. Wis. 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 385.
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in the absence of a product with a definitely determinable market
value. 4'
A common problem arising in connection with a separate
accounting is the apportionment of overhead and other types of
general expense. The usual rule that the apportionment factor
or factors must bear a rational relationship to the expense ap-
portioned resembles that with respect to the apportionment of in-
come. A common regulation 242 provides that, "Overhead items
of income and expense must be allocated to the business within
and without [the state] upon a basis or combination of bases,
justified by facts and conditions." A sales ratio is then mentioned
as satisfactory in apportioning overhead in a mercantile business
24 3
and direct cost of material and labor as satisfactory in a construc-
tion business.2 42 Federal income taxes are, in these regulations,
apportioned on the basis of net income.24 3  In one case in which
a separate accounting was denied there were involved overhead
charges for management and purchasing.244 In other cases a sep-
arate accounting has been allowed where a proper apportionment
has been made of such expense items as management, rent, adver-
tising and accounting.245
24'Laurentide v. Durey, (N.D. N.Y. 1916) 231 Fed. 223; Billwiller's
Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 31
F. (2d) 286.242Arizona, art. 606 note 231 above; Kansas, art. 79 note 220 above;
Louisiana, art. 214 note 135 above; Wisconsin, art. 702.2 note 220 above.
Art. 224 of the 1935 Iowa Regulations provides that "Overhead items of
income and expense must be allocated to the business within and without
Iowa on a basis which utilizes the factors by which such items are
measured."243Arizona, art. 606; Kansas, art. 79; Louisiana, art. 214; Wisconsin,
art. 602.1. All cited in note 242 above. Also see ruling (Wis. Tax Comm'n
Feb. 15, 1924) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-820.04.
244S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 353:
. for instance, the services performed by the executive offices and pur-
chasing department are charged for at a rate of two per cent, not on the in-
voice cost of the goods furnished to the store, but on the gross sales to the
stores. If the New York stores were receiving higher prices for the same
goods . . . they would be paying a disproportionate amount of the expense.
. . " The court did not discuss two per cent and five per cent charges
made by the importing and jobbing departments.
245Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, (1929) 197
Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85. The Wisconsin business was "charged at the
market price with all products received by it, with the expense of transacting
the business, including a proper allocation of general or overhead expenses
and office accounting. . . . " p. 87. In Curtis Companies v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm'n, (1933) 214 Wis. 85, 251 N. W. 497, 92 A. L. R. 1065 and J. G.
McCrary v. Commission of Corps and Taxation, (1932) 280 Mass. 273,
182 N. E. 481, the question of separate accounting for subsidiary corporations
was involved. In the former, the tax commission claimed the separate
accounting involved "four arbitrary factors, to wit: (1) The 11/2 per cent
margin allowed to factories on sales to the distributing subsidiaries; (2)
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More difficult than the apportionment of expense items, is
the allocation of that portion of total net income attributable to
the performance of business functions which, although not directly
productive of gross receipts, are absolutely necessary to the con-
tinuance of the business and the earning of its income. This
problem, when first raised in the Kresge Case246 in connection
with the purchase and warehousing of goods, was involved only
indirectly. Nor was the question of buying profit directly passed
upon, although raised in the Hans Rees' Sons Case.24 7 Recently, how-
ever, the Kansas court in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n allowed an expense ratio apportionment of income at-
tributable to the performance outside the state of these and other
business functions.2-4 8  Legal recognition was thus granted to that
economic income which may be "earned" in the performance of
essential business functions. The secondary problem of the
selection of an appropriate apportionment ratio, of course, re-
mains. It is not always easy to determine whether the solution
the distribution of advertising charges; (3) the distribution of general ad-
ministrative charges; and (4) the rental charged." In the latter case the
parent company charged a flat 10 per cent commission for purchases made by
it and effected a sales ratio apportionment among its subsidiaries of the
expense of window displays, administration and other similar charges.240(S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 353, 355. The court said, "Further-
more, the net income allocated to New York should reflect all the plaintiff's
activities within the state. In addition to the operation of the individual
stores, the plaintiff operated here a warehouse for the entire system and also
purchased goods here for the entire system. Such profit as may have re-
sulted from these activities is not completely reflected in the aggregate net
profit of the individual stores within the state, which plaintiff contends is
the entire net income attributable to New York."
2
-17Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, (1930) 283 U. S. 123, 135, 51
Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879. The court said, "The so-called "buying
profit" is said to result from the skill with which hides are bought and
the contention is that these buying operations were not conducted in North
Carolina .... It is apparent that the amount of the asserted buying profit
is not enough to affect the result . .."
248Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151 Kan.
159, 98 P. (2d) 143 involved a retail merchandise store operating over 500
branches in United States 21 to 24 of which were located in Kansas. It
had a warehouse in Kansas City, Mo., and all buying was done outside
the state. In addition offices outside the state issued complete instruction
relative to store operation; prepared all store budgets, window and counter
displays, advertising copy and special sales; gave detailed directions with
respect to stocking and displaying merchandise; designed all store buildings;
selected all store equipment; employed all store managers and department
heads; conducted all hauling, accounting, tax and claim matters; and
carried on other activities of similar nature. A pro rata cost of such activities
was allowed as an expense in computing Kansas net income. The tax-
payer successfully claimed an additional 15 per cent (expense ratio appor-
tionment) reduction on the ground that such sum represented net income
reasonably attributable to extra-state activities.
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of this aspect of the problem involves a separate accounting or
an equitable apportionment. 4 9
C, Allocation by Equitable Apportionment.-The problems of
equitable apportionment 250 are principally those of administration
and constitutional law.
1. Administrative Methods.-Statutes providing for an equit-
able apportionment range from those which provide for limited
adjustments of the apportionment fraction to those which permit
any method considered appropriate by the tax authority, whether
by a selection of a factor (factors) or by separate accounting
methods. In some states where a three-way formula obtains,
provision for adjustment is made by permitting the omission of
any one or any two of the three factors. The factors which are
considered "inapplicable" are to be excluded .2 1  Thus, a two-
way fraction of property and sales has, on occasion, been per-
mitted in Wisconsin where a three-way one is commonly used.25 2
A weighting of a factor or factors may sometimes be allowed. - 3
Or statutes may specify that income may be apportioned on the
basis of any one or more of a group of named factors.25 4 Under
24 9See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1940) 151
Kan. 159, 98 P. (2d) 143.
260By equitable apportionment is usually meant the selection of a method
of allocation which will assign to a state that portion of net income which
approximates the amount thought properly taxable under some pre-
conceived notion of fairness. See note 13 above.2 5 1Massachusetts, Gen. L. 1932, ch. 63, sec. 38.3; Pennsylvania, Purdon's
Statutes, Tit. 72, sec. 3420b, 2, (a) (3) and Regulations, par. 3-05 in Pa.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-809c. See also sec. 42 of the Massachusetts
act which provides for additional methods of apportionment. Art. 610 of the
Arizona Regulations (Ariz. C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 10-347, p. 247-44) sec.
57-2707 of the South Dakota, Code 1939, and Art. 602-5 of the Wisconsin
Regulations (Wis. C.C.H. Tax Service, par. 10-829) provides for omission
of a factor if not used "to any appreciable extent in the (his) trade or
business." See ruling Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 1922, Wis. P. H. Tax
Service, par. 11,155-9 . . . commission "may modify the rule" of apportion-
ment to produce correct result. See Idaho, Reg. No. 49 Art. 9 providing that
the formula may be "modified." See New York law in note 253 below.25 2Appeal of Speer-Rosefelt Calendar Co., (Wis. Tax Comm'n, Nov.
6, 1926) Wis. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 10-829.01.253 Arizona, Art. 610 of Regulations above; Wisconsin, Art. 602.5 of
Regulations above. In both states additional and wider powers are granted
in other sections with respect to equitable apportionment. Arizona, Re-
vised Code 1934 Supplement, sec. 3182x, 3 (b) and Wisconsin, Statutes 1939,
sec. 71.02 (3) (d) 4.
2 54California franchise tax act in Deering 1939 Supplement to Cal.
Codes Act 8494a, sec. 13 and North Dakota, Compiled Laws, sec. 2346a7
(6) as amended in 1931, Laws 1931, ch. 283, sec. 2 permit ".. . allocation on
the basis of sales, purchases, expenses of manufacture, payroll, value and
situs of tangible property or by reference to any of these or other fac-
tors. . . . " See also sec. 2346a7 (5) of North Dakota Statutes. Section
214-7a of the 1935 New York corporate franchise tax (McKinney's Con-
solidated Laws of New York Art. 9-A Book 59, sec. 214-7a) is more
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this rule one state apparently has selected three of five statutory
factors as standard. 25  The provisions most widely followed,
however, vest a much broader discretion in the tax authority and
may permit or approve "such method as will equitably allocate"
to the state a "just portion" of the total net income ;25 or such
"method of allocation or apportionment as seems best calculated
to assign" to the state that portion derived from or reasonably
attributable to sources within the state ;257 or such method as
"will fairly reflect" 2 8 or which "more clearly reflects '259 the net
income taxable within the state.
In all states the burden of showing the occasion for an equit-
able apportionment, if sought by the taxpayer, is upon it. A com-
mon provision is one which permits an aggrieved taxpayer to
file with the tax authority an alternative method of allocation with
supporting information and proof. If the tax authority shall
conclude that the statutory formula "is inapplicable and inequit-
able," a redetermination is permitted on the basis proposed by
restricted, permitting the commission to add to the standard ratio (per-
centage) a "percentage applicable to this state of either gross sales or gross
receipts and also a percentage applicable ... of gross expenses ... and divide
by three." In People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, (1920)
230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202, the court by construction modified a statutoryformula to make it comply with constitutional limitations. In State ex rel.
Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., (1933) 204 N. C. 365, 168 S. E. 397,
90 A. L. R. 476, a taxpayer which attempted to add an intangible property
factor to a formula containing a tangible property factor was unsuccessful.
255In the Matter of the Appeal of Pacific-Burt Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of
Equal., 1939) and Op. Cal. Att. Gen. Jan. 28, 1930, Cal. C. C. H. Tax
Service, par. 5-803.06 the taxpayer sought to have a "purchase" factor added
to those of property, payroll and sales. The board considered the facts
shown by the taxpayer insufficient to justify such action. In Appeal of
El Dorado Oil Works, (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Nov. 15, 1939) Cal. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 5-803.017, the taxpayer urged the application of all five
statutory factors including property, payroll, sales, manufacturing expense
and purchases. The board took the view that the last two factors were
sufficiently represented by the first three and excluded them both. Accord:
Appeal of Charles Harley Co., (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Dec. 14, 1931) Cal.
C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.10. See par. 5-803.10. In a letter of
Nov. 17, 1938 the California board has drawn attention to the fact that the
omission of a factor is not dependent upon the absence of the corresponding
business activity merely within the state but upon its complete absence
from the business as a whole. See Cal. C. C. H. Tax Service, par. 5-803.016.
2tColorado, Laws 1937, ch. 175, sec. 18 (a) ; Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1935,
sec. 79-3219; Oklahoma, Income Tax Law 1935, sec. 8 (g) as amended by
sec. 2 of Art. 10 of ch. 66 of 1939 laws.
257Connecticut, Laws 1935, ch. 221, sec. 8 (sec. 423c of 1935 Cumulative
Supp.) ; District of Columbia 1939 Regulations, Art. 3 (c) in D. C. C. C. H.
Tax Service, par. 10-802; New Mexico, Laws 1933, ch. 85, sec. 31 (d)
Virginia, Tax Code, sec. 54.
25SMason's 1940 Supplement, sec. 2394-26.
259South Dakota, Art. 2707 (h) of Regulations, par. 14-591 of S. D.
C. C. H. Tax Service.
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the taxpayer or upon such other method as assigns to the state
the portion of income attributable thereto.2 60  Other statutes pro-
vide that the unfairness of the apportionment formula must
"appear to the tax commission ;-1261 must "be shown to the satisfac-
tion" of the tax authority;262 or that the commission find such
unfairness. 3 Most of the statutes allow an equitable apportion-
ment as an alternative to the method of fractional apportionment.
A few, however, provide that the separate accounting method
as well must first be shown unavailable. 264 With respect to this
burden of proof an equitable apportionment resembles a separate
accounting. Thus, in North American Cement Corporation v.
Graves2 5 the taxpayer objected to an allocation on a fractional
basis and urged an application of an equitable apportionment
under the provisions of statute on the basis of its reports, state-
ments and accounts. This objection was overruled in the court of
last resort with the statement that "the statute is valid upon its
face and it has not been shown to have been so applied as to
violate appellant's constitutional rights." Where a taxpayer
operating a chain of restaurants within and without the state
was involved, the New York court has likewise adopted a frac-
tional apportionment in preference to an equitable one.266 On the
other hand a showing by the taxpayer that all its factories were
outside the state and that only sales activities were carried on
within the state has been considered sufficient to justify the appli-
cation of an equitable apportionment in the place of one by a
sales ratio fraction.
267
26 0Connecticut, Laws 1935, ch. 221, sec. 8, (sec. 423c of 1935 Cumulative
Supp.) ; District of Columbia 1939 Regulations, Art. 3 (c) note 257 above;
Iowa, Code 1939, sec. 6943.065, 2; New Mexico, income tax law note 257
above, sec. 31 (d); Virginia, Tax Code, sec. 54. See Colorado, income
tax law note 256 above, sec. 18 (a) ; Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1935, sec. 79-3219.26IMassachusetts income tax law note 251 above sec. 38; New York,
corporate franchise tax act note 254 above sec. 214-7a; North Dakota,
statutes note 254 above sec. 2346a7, (5).262South Dakota, Code 1939, sec. 57.2707; Wisconsin, Statutes 1939,
sec. 71.02 (3) (d) 4. See Georgia, Statutes, sec. 92-3115. Art. 2707 (h)
of the S. D. Regulations note 259 above provides that "the taxpayer shall
have the burden of establishing the invalidity" of the method determined
by the tax authority as applicable.
263Minnesota, Mason's Supplement, sec. 2394-26.264Arizona, Regulations, Art. 610 and Idaho, Regulations No. 49, Art. 9
note 251 above.
265(1936) 243 App. Div. 834, 278 N. Y. S. 920; 269 N. Y. 507, 199 N. E.
510; 299 U. S. 517, 57 Sup. Ct. 311, 81 L. Ed. 381.26 6People ex rel. Childs Co. v. Gilchrist, (1927) 221 App. Div. 822,
224 N. Y. S. 885.2670p. N. M. Att. Gen. Sept. 23, 1939 in N. M. C. C. H., and P. H.
Tax Service, pars. 1566 and 13,000 respectively.
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Corresponding to the burden of proof upon the taxpayer is
that upon the tax authority, in those cases in which it seeks an
equitable apportionment, 28 of showing sufficient facts to support
its determination. In United Advertising Corporation v. Lynch28
the court, in allowing an equitable apportionment, held that the
New York act'270 clearly permitted the commission to segregate
the activity or business done within or without the state. In this
case the tax commission acted upon information disclosed in the
taxpayer's return and upon testimony given at a hearing. In
another case, however, the court denied the tax commission the
power to apply an equitable apportionment for its failure to show
that the formula was unfair.2 71  The statute provided that if in
-
8 SThe right of the tax authority to seek an equitable apportionment
would be a logical deduction from the statutory purpose of the provision to
avoid the inaccuracies of the other two methods. Thus, the circumstance
that the formula method was unfair to the government would be just as
valid a justification for equitable adjustment as would the circumstance that
the formula method worked injustice to the taxpayer. Notwithstanding such
consideration, however, the statutes or regulations of several states empha-
size the taxpayer's right and remain silent with respect to a corresponding
right, if any, on the part of the state. Thus Art. 7 (f)-4 of the Regulations
to the 1935 California personal income tax law provides, "if a nonresident
taxpayer believes that the net income from sources within this state cannot
properly be determined by the above (formula) method, he may employ...
another method .... " Compare Minnesota Statutes, Mason's 1940 Supple-
ment, sec. 2394-26. Also compare sec. 6943.065, 2 of the Iowa, Code
1934; sec. 31 (d) of the New Mexico law note 257 above and sec. 54 of
the Virginia tax code which provide that the portion assigned to the state
by equitable apportionment shall be a sum "not exceeding, however, the
amount which would be arrived at by application of the statutory rules."
Some statutes, however, are explicit to the contrary. Sec. 8 of ch. 134 of
Connecticut, Laws 1935, note 260 above provides in part, "If in the opinion
of the commissioner such method of allocation . . . will so operate as to
subject any taxpayer to taxation on a lesser portion ... than is reasonably
attributable to this state" then there may be a hearing and a selection of
another method of allocation. Compare Arizona, Art. 610 of Regulations
note 251 above; California, franchise tax act note 254 above sec. 15;
Colorado, Laws 1937, sec. 18 (a); Idaho, Art. 9 of Regulations No. 49;
Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1935, sec. 19; Oklahoma, sec. 8 (g) of act note 256
above; New York, franchise tax act, sec. 214-7a of act note 254 above;
North Dakota, sec. 2346a7, (5) of statutes note 254 above. The statutes or
regulations in the following states may well be construed to permit a right
to an equitable apportionment to the state: District of Columbia, Art. 3 (c)
regulations note 257 above; Georgia, sec. 92-3115 of statutes; South Dakota,
Code, sec. 57-2707; Wisconsin, Statutes 1939, sec. 71.02 (3) (d) 4. See also
cases in text above.
209(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 243. See also State Revenue
Comm'n v. Edgar Bros. Co., (1937) 185 Ga. 216, 194 S. E. 505.
27oSec. 211-(9)-4 of act note 273 below provided in part, "If it shall
appear ... that the segregation of assets . .. does not properly reflect . . .
the income earned-the tax commission is authorized and empowered to
equitably adjust the tax .... " See notes 276 to 281 post and text.
27'California Packing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1939) 97 Utah
367, 93 P. (2d) 463.
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the judgment of the tax commission the formula did not fairly
or equitably allocate income, it could on such information as it
might obtain, make an allocation fairly calculated to assign to the
state income reasonably attributable thereto. The "judgment"
of the tax commission was here held to have been wrongly exer-
cised. In another and somewhat analogous case a tax commis-
sioner failed to show that business within the state was not "other-
wise more easily and certainly separable from such total busi-
ness." 272  For this failure of proof the method of allocation
desired by the taxpayer was allowed, instead of that sought by the
commissioner.2 7 3  Although these cases indicate that the tax
authority has a burden of fact finding which in a way corresponds
to the burden of proof upon the taxpayer, the degree of such
proof remains an open question. In view of the taxpayer's ready
access to its own books and records and its familiarity with its
own business methods it may well be that it must show its case
in greater detail and with more certainty than the tax authority.
2. Constitutional Limitations.-The principal constitutional
problem concerns the question whether the grant of power to the
tax authority constitutes a delegation of a legislative function
or whether there is merely given a direction for the exercise of
executive power. There are various rules in the several states.
Some states allow the legislature to give the tax authority an
unlimited grant of discretion, while others may limit the discretion
to the selection of a specified alternative method or possibly to
the selection of one of several specified alternative methods. The
decisions of the New York court of appeals have applied this
stricter rule .
27
The New York statute27 in effect in 1925 empowered the tax
commission "to equitably adjust the tax upon the basis of the
272Ford Motor Co. v. State, (1935) 65 N. D. 316, 258 N. W. 596 where
proof by the commissioner of facts justifying a separate accounting was
chiefly involved.273The assistant auditor of the taxpayer proved to be a disappointing
witness for the commissioner. Prior to 1920, the taxpayer used a branch
office method of accounting suitable to allocation by separate accounting.
The North Dakota law was enacted and the taxpayer's accounting system
changed. The assistance auditor "On being asked whether it was abandoned
on account of the enactment of the income tax law in North Dakota ...
answered: 'No, it was abandoned everywhere regardless of whether there
was an income tax or not.'"
274See in addition to New York cases, the discussion in International
Elevator Co. v. Thoresen, (1929) 58 N. D. 776, 228 N. W. 1920.
275Paragraph 4 of subdivision 9 of sec. 211 of Art. 9-A of the Tax
Laws as amended by ch. 322 of the 1925 Laws and repealed by Laws 1934,
ch. 418, sec. 1.
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corporate activity or the business done within and without the
state." Although this statute was apparently approved without
discussion in two federal cases,27 it was finally invalidated by the
state court as "too vague to state a workable rule. '277  Two years
later the commission attempted to limit the scope of these earlier
decisions by calling the court's attention to another section of the
statute27, providing that for purposes of equitable taxation in-
come from any source may be included or excluded, provided
only that the assets from which the income arose shall be included
in any segregation for the purpose of computing the tax." How-
ever, both the appellate division279 and the court of appeals 280 con-'
sidered the earlier decisions controlling and, with one judge dis-
senting in each court, held the apportionment formula would have
to be applied. To meet the limitations laid down in these cases,
the New York legislature modified 28 ' the law so as to permit the
tax commission to add to the statutory ratio "the percentage
applicable to this state of either gross sales or gross receipts and
also the percentage applicable to this state of gross expenses," and
to divide the result so found by three. If this statute should be
considered to avoid the proscription of being too vague and is
valid, it would seem that several methods of apportionment
would be permitted under the New York rule. An equitable
apportionment by the method of omission of one or more factors
from a group of factors ;212 by the method of the weighting of
specified factors ;283 or by the method of a selection of a factor
from a group of selected factors, 284 would all appear to be valid.
2
7GSee North American Cement Corporation v. Graves, (1936) Per
curiam decisions in 243 App. Div. 834, 278 N. Y. S. 920; 269 N. Y. 507,
199 N. E. 510, 299 U. S. 517, 57 Sup. Ct. 311, 81 L. Ed. 381, and United
Advertising Corporation v. Lynch, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 243.
It is interesting to note that both of these cases were decided subsequent
to the cases cited in the following note.2 
7People ex rel. Ducas Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, (1932) 260 N. Y.
525, 184 N. E. 77; People ex rel. Schild Co. v. Lynch, (1932) 260 N. Y.
526, 184 N. E. 78.278Laws 1927, ch. 479, sec. 209.
270People ex rel. Schluter & Co. v. Lynch, (1934) 241 App. Div. 632,
269 N. Y. S. 971.
280(1934) 264 N. Y. 680, 191 N. E. 624.
28lSubdivision 7a was added to sec. 214 of Art. 9-A of the tax laws in
1934 (Laws 1934 ch. 418, sec. 2) ; and amended in 1935 (Laws 1935 ch. 745,
sec. 17). See historical note at page 466 of Book 59 of McKinney's Con-
solidated Laws of New York.
2 82See note 251 above. The omission of factors would seem a stronger
case than addition of factors.
2
-See note 253 above.284See note 254 above.
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In People ex rel. Schluter & Co v. Lynch2s5 the alternate factors
were not specified. This distinction may well mark the line of
constitutional prohibition.
Decisions of the courts of South Carolina -28s and Georgia-8 7
have expounded a much broader rule. In both states, the statutes
at one time levied a tax upon income from business within the
state-88 and granted respective tax commissions a general rule-
making power. -8 9 In both states the court upheld under these
statutes 20 the action of the tax commission in making an alloca-
tion, and overruled the contention of the taxpayers that there
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The
only express limitation put upon the tax commission's power was
that the method it employed should be reasonable. 29 1 This is the
usual limitation to which all methods of allocation are subject.
In another state, however, an administrative allocation was in-
validated where the statute imposed a tax upon income "from
any source whatever" instead of upon income, as provided in the
South Carolina and Georgia statutes, from sources within the
state.292 With this limitation added the rule of these courts may
28 People ex rel. Schluter & Co. v. Lynch, (1934) 241 App. Div. 632,
269 N. Y. S. 971: (1934) 264 N. Y. 680, 191 N. E. 624.2s6Santee Mills v. Query, (1922) 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202; see
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Query, (1927) 144 S. C. 234, 142 S. E. 509.2s7State Revenue Comm'n v. Edgar Bros. Co., (1937) 185 Ga. 216, 194
S. E. 505.28Sin South Carolina the statute taxed nonresidents and foreign corpo-
rations on income "from property owned or from business operations from
within the state" and in Georgia foreign corporations were required to
make return of income "confined ... to business done within the state."
2 8
9The South Carolina statute conferred upon the tax commission
power to make rules and regulations not inconsistent with law for the
enforcement of the act and in Georgia the tax commission was empowered
to make all necessary regulations for carrying out the provisions of the act.
29O1nSouth Carolina the statute also provided that the tax was to be
computed on the separable net income from business within the state and
in Georgia the statute provided that the taxpayer should make its own
segregation in its return and also that in the absence of a return, the tax
commission could make one on the best information available.
291The court said in the Georgia case: "Whether the method used by
the commission was unreasonable was a question not determined either by
the trial court or the court of appeals.... That question must be determined
upon a reexamination of the case under the decision herein rendered."
292Commonwealth v. P. Lorillard Co., (1921) 129 Va. 74, 105 S. E. 683.
The Virginia statute also failed to provide for an allocation by the taxpayer's
return as the statutes did which were under consideration in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Query, (1922) 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202, and in State
Revenue Comm'n v. Edgar Bros. Co., (1937) 185 Ga. 216, 194 S. E. 505.
However, in view of Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202,
these differences appear less important than the statutory provision limiting
taxable income to that earned within the state. For other aspects of the
same 1916 Virginia Statute, see Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, (1920)
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be stated to be that the legislature may delegate to the tax
authority the selection of any fair method of allocation, provided
the legislature specifies that an allocation is to be made.
CONCLUSION
No one of the four states within which our manufacturing
company carried on its activities may tax its entire income.2 93
Each one may, however, in the proper situation, tax a portion.
Propriety in each case depends upon whether the company is
doing business within the state and whether any income is attribut-
able thereto. All courts would hold that the manufacturing
company was doing business within the state of its factory and
within the state of its branch sales office. Whether the same
conclusion would be reached with respect to the company's pur-
chases or management is a question of fact dependent upon the
kind and extent of these activities. All courts would attribute
a portion of the company's net income to its factory operation
and to its sales activities. If the company's conduct of its pur-
chasing or of its management constituted doing business, the
same result would probably be reached with respect to them.
If not, the opposite conclusion would be likely.
In order to determine the portion of its net income separately
taxable in each of the four states the taxpayer may, perhaps, in
each state, seek an allocation by a separate accounting. To do so it
must first comply with statutory conditions. This may involve
proof of the accuracy and reliability of accounting records or of
the unfairness of the statutory fraction or, with respect to its
manufacturing and selling activities of an independent market
price of its product, or of still other statutory prerequisites. On
the facts this manufacturing company would in all probability
find it impossible to comply with even the minimum, conditions
253 U. S. 412, 40 Sup. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989. Both the Lorillard and the
Royster Guano Cases quoted with approval the 1918 amendment to the
1916 statute providing that taxable income be limited to that "from business
transacted and property located within the state, which may be determined
by an allocation and separate accounting." In a situation somewhat similar
to that involved in the Lorillard case the tax administrator instead of making
an allocation imposed a tax upon the entire income. This assessment was
in Porto Rico Mercantile Co. v. Gallardo, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d)
526 held "unlawful and void."
-3The power of the state of the company's "business domicil" to tax
income from business without the state has not as yet been directly deter-
mined by the courts. Compare note 30 above, "Dividends." The power
of the state of incorporation is a subject beyond the scope of this article.
See note 1.
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in so far as its management and purchases are concerned. Con-
versely, the tax authority may seek a separate accounting.
Whether it has this right is doubtful under the statutes of most
states. Equally uncertain are the conditions of this right, if any.
Or the company may seek an allocation by statutory apportion-
ment. It may demand this method as of right unless it is inaccurate
and unfair. In that case the tax authority in many states probably
has the right to substitute an equitable apportionment, and pos-
sibly in some states the right to substitute a separate accounting.
The degree of inaccuracy and the degree of its proof have not
been clearly defined in any state. Conversely, the tax authority
may seek an allocation by fractional apportionment. This method
is in many states prima facie correct. The company would have
the burden of showing it to be inapplicable. The extent and
degree of this burden, however, are differently defined in different
states. Or the company may seek an allocation by equitable
apportionment. Again it must comply with the statutory condi-
tions by showing the statutory fraction unfair, or by showing
a separate accounting unavailable, or by showing other
statutory prerequisites fulfilled. On the facts the manu-
facturing company may well find this method of allocation the
only accurate one for the state in which its management is located
and for the state in which its purchases are made. Conversely
again, the tax authority may seek an allocation by equitable
apportionment. In many states it can, but again only upon
compliance with the various statutory conditions.
